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Speculative thinking is the thinking about things that are not currently real, which 
includes counterfactual thinking, prefactual thinking, and some other kinds of thinking. 
Through four experimental chapters (10 experiments), I explored the functions of speculative 
thinking from a general perspective.  
Experiment 1 showed that learning that a protagonist had engaged in counterfactual 
thinking (compared to no counterfactual thinking) resulted in participants inferring that the 
past event was closer in time to the protagonist. Experiment 2 demonstrated that participants 
were not affected by the number of counterfactual statements they read when inferring 
temporal closeness. Experiment 3 demonstrated that participants who learned that a 
protagonist had engaged in counterfactual thinking (compared to no counterfactual thinking) 
were more likely to infer that the protagonist experienced the controllable event. Experiment 
4 indicated that participants who learned that a protagonist had engaged in counterfactual 
thinking (compared to no counterfactual thinking) were more likely to infer that the 
protagonist experienced the exceptional event. Experiment 5 showed that construal level of 
describing far psychological distance activities were higher than that of describing close 
psychological distance activities, and construal level of describing past activities were higher 
than that of describing future activities. Experiment 6 demonstrated that participants doing 
Realistic Prefactual Thinking elicited more controllable modifications than participants doing 
Hypothetical Prefactual Thinking. Experiment 7 indicated that, participants doing 
Hypothetical Prefactual Thinking focused on more controllable modifications than 
participants doing Counterfactual Thinking. Experiment 8 showed that thinking about 
closeness did not lead to more controllable modifications than thinking about distance. 
Experiment 9 showed that participants were more likely to say that a protagonist 




event. Experiment 10 showed that participants expected protagonists to lie about controllable 
events rather than uncontrollable events. 
To conclude, this thesis not only explored the traditional function of improving future 
performance that speculative thinking serves (i.e., the preparatory function), but also studied 
the functions that have not been widely discussed (i.e., the function to convey information 
through others’ counterfactuals, and the function of generating lies), also explored the 
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1.1. Speculative thinking 
1.1.1. Speculative Thinking about the Past and Future 
In our daily life, we often think how things would have been different in the past, and 
how things would or will be different in the future. For example, you rush to the train station, 
but found that your train left 5 minutes ago. You may think about how things would have 
been different in the past, like “if I was not delayed by the traffic jam, I could have arrived at 
the train station on time”; or you may think about how things would or will be different in the 
future, like “if next time I leave home earlier, I would arrive at the train station on time”. 
Imagining how things would have been different in the past is called Counterfactual Thinking 
(e.g. Beck, & Riggs, 2014; Byrne, 2002; Kahneman & Tversky, 1981; Roese, 1997). 
Kahneman and Tversky (1981) first proposed the concept of counterfactual thinking in a 
paper discussing heuristic simulation. They suggested that, heuristic simulation could be 
thought of as a conscious reactivation of past behaviours that had been stored in memory. 
Imagining how things would or will differ in the future is called Prefactual Thinking (e.g. 
Epstude, Scholl, & Roese, 2016; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007). Both counterfactual and 
prefactual thinking are two types of general speculative thinking: by which I mean thoughts 
about things that are not currently real.  
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the functions of speculative thinking of past 
and future. Through four experimental chapters, I will explore the functions of speculative 
thinking from a general perspective. Specifically, these experimental chapters not only 
explore the traditional function that speculative thinking serves (i.e., improving future 
performance), but also study the functions that have not been widely discussed (i.e., the 
function to convey information through others’ counterfactuals, and the function of 
generating lies), also explore the different functions between speculative thinking of the past 




past and future). Then I will focus on reviewing the literature on counterfactual thinking (as 
speculative thinking about the past).  
1.1.2. The Relationship between Thinking about the Past and Future 
There are many studies that focus on the relationship between thinking about the past 
and future, showing a diversity of evidence. The evidences include different areas such as 
neuropsychology, developmental psychology, and research on aging. These evidences not 
only demonstrate the connection between thinking about the past and future, but also 
demonstrate the difference between thinking about the past and future. 
From a neuropsychology perspective, research has shown that thinking about the past 
and future have common cognitive neural basis. Some researchers have demonstrated that 
patients with damaged hippocampus have difficulty in both the thinking about the past and 
future, and their thinking about the past and future lack scene details compared to the age-
matched control group (Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007). Many neuroimaging 
researchers have suggested that a common neural network will be activated when thinking 
about the past and the future (e.g. Hassabis & Maguire, 2007; Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 
2002; Schacter & Addis, 2002; Viard et al., 2011). For example, through an fMRI experiment, 
Viard et al. (2011) systematically studied the common neural network basis and the 
phenomenological differences between thinking about the past and future. Neuroimaging 
results showed that bilateral parieto-fronto-temporal networks are activated when recalling 
the past and envisioning the future, which indicates thinking about the past and future are 
based on the same brain activation areas. The main activated brain regions include: posterior 
cingulate cortex, anterior cranial lobes, and medial prefrontal cortex, which are mainly 
involve the process of recalling the past and anticipating the future. The central and top 
frontal gyrus are also activated, which can control the retrieval of semantic information and 




activated to combine different details to construct a coherent scene about past or future events 
(e.g. Botzung, Denkova, & Manning, 2008; Hassabis, Kumaran, & Maguire, 2007; Northoff 
& Bermpohl, 2004; Raposo, Han, & Dobbins, 2009). Berryhill, Picasso, Arnold, Drowos, and 
Olson (2010) explored the relationship between two brain regions (i.e. posterior parietal 
cortex and prefrontal cortex) and the ability of thinking about the past and future. Participants 
who have unilateral prefrontal lesions or bilateral posterior parietal lesions were asked to 
describe past and future events. The results showed that participants who suffered damage in 
these two brain regions were both impaired in their ability to recall the past and imagine the 
future. This suggests that these two brain regions are activated both when thinking about the 
past and future. 
Also, some researchers suggested that the aging effects on the quality of thinking 
about the past and future seem to be the same – older people produce fewer details than 
young people when both recalling the past and anticipating the future (e.g. Addis, Wong, & 
Schacter, 2008). Specifically, Addis et al. (2008) interviewed young and elderly participants. 
All participants in the interview need to recall some events that happened in the past (i.e. past 
few weeks and past few years), and imagine some events that may happen in the future (i.e. 
next few weeks and next few years). Participants were asked to give as many details as 
possible when describing these events. Researchers then counted the total number of details 
of the events described by participants. Results showed that elderly participants gave fewer 
details on both past and future events than young participants. 
In addition, thinking about the past and future are also related in child development. 
Busby and Suddendorf (2010) suggested that thinking about the past and future developed 
together in child development. The researchers explored the ability of children to describe 
past and future events. In one study, children needed to read stories that describe a character 




Children were asked to determine which character now has the item. For four-year-olds, 
results showed that the correct rates of answering past or future stories were not significantly 
different, and neither were different to chance. For five-year-olds, the correct rates of 
answering to past or future stories were also similar, which are both higher than that of four-
year-olds. Researchers suggested that thinking about the past and future are developing 
together. Suddendorf (2010) explored the relationship that exists in children’s development 
between remembering the past and planning the future. In the study, children participants 
aged 3 and 4 were asked to report what they did yesterday (i.e. “tell me something that you 
did yesterday?”), and what they will do tomorrow (i.e. “tell me something that you are going 
to do tomorrow?”). By checking with children’s parents about what children did and will do, 
the researchers found that four-year-old participants (compared to three-year-old participants) 
reported more correct answers for both past and future events. The results also showed that 
there is a correlation between the number of past and future events reported by participants. 
This demonstrates that thinking about the future and thinking about the past are both 
developing with age. Naito and Suzuki (2011) also suggested that there is a developmental 
relationship between thinking about the past and future, suggesting thinking about the future 
is developed from thinking about the past.  
Despite the similarity between the thinking about the past and future, there are 
differences between the two – the past events are real experiences, while the future events are 
based on predictions or judgments. Anderson and Dewhurst (2009) found that past events 
contain more perceptual details than future events. Specifically, adults participants needed to 
imagine future events or recall past events. Participants in the past group completed the 
sentence ‘‘Last year I...’’, and participants in the future group completed the sentence “Next 
year I ...”. Results showed that participants in the future group generated more general events 




more specific events (“Last year I took my driving test”). Researchers suggested that these 
results reflect that when individuals think about the past, they can more access to direct 
experiences based on events. Therefore, thinking about the past (compared to thinking about 
the future) will have clearer representations of temporal and spatial information, and more 
coherent storylines.  
Furthermore, the difference between thinking about the past and future is also 
reflected in the tendency that people are more inclined to imagine future events (compared to 
recalling past events) as positive events, suggesting there is an optimistic bias in thinking 
about the future (e.g. D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2006; Taylor & Brown, 1988). For 
example, D'Argembeau and Van der Linden (2006) explored individual differences in 
evaluating the valence of past and future events. Researchers asked participants to remember 
some past events (e.g., yesterday, a week ago, a month ago, etc.), or imagine some future 
events (e.g., tomorrow, in a week, in one month, etc.). Participants needed to write a short 
description for each event, and then evaluated the valence on a seven-point scale for each 
event (“When/if this event happened, my emotions were/would be: −3 = very negative, 0 = 
neutral, +3 = very positive”). Results showed that participants tended to think that future 
events are more positive than past events. 
There are also neuroimaging studies that explored the differences between thinking 
about the past and future. For example, Addis, Wong, and Schacter (2007) explored the 
activation of brain regions when people think about the past and future. Specifically, the 
researchers asked participants to imagine an event that occurred in a specific time period (a 
week, a year, 5-20 years) in the past or in the future. The results showed that the left 
hippocampus and posterior visuospatial regions often are both engaged in past and future 
event thinking. However, thinking about the future also leads to activation of the right 




thinking about the past) has a higher activation level in the posterior parietal cortex that plays 
a role in the attention process. Therefore, this indicates that thinking about the future requires 
more attention resources than thinking about the past (e.g. Cabeza, 2008; Ciaramelli, Grady, 
& Moscovitch, 2008).  
In section 1.1 I reviewed literature on comparing thinking about the past and future, 
and literature on general speculative thinking about the past and future. Among speculative 
thinking, counterfactual thinking and prefactual thinking are two typical kinds of speculative 
thinking, and there are also other types of speculative thinking. In general, speculative 
thinking refers to thoughts about things that are not currently real. 
1.2. Counterfactual Thinking 
Research on counterfactual thinking is the main research area of speculative thinking, 
and there is relatively less research on other kinds of speculative thinking (e.g. prefactual 
thinking). Discussing the research and theories of counterfactual thinking can provide 
theoretical background for the exploration of general speculative thinking in later chapters. 
Therefore, in the following literature review, I will focus on counterfactual thinking (as a 
specific kind of speculative thinking of the past), discussing some research and theories of 
counterfactual thinking.  
1.2.1. The Classification of Counterfactual Thinking 
Roese and Olson (1993) suggested that counterfactual thinking includes three types: 
additive counterfactual thinking, the subtractive counterfactual thinking, and the substitutive 
counterfactual thinking. Among them, additive counterfactual thinking refers to 
counterfactual thinking that adds some imaginary antecedents, subtractive counterfactual 
thinking refers to counterfactual thinking that takes out some imaginary antecedents, and 
substitutive counterfactual thinking refers to counterfactual thinking that replaces the original 




example, a student could think counterfactually that “if I had come to the review class, I 
could have passed the exam this time”, which is an additive counterfactual statement because 
“come to the review class” did not actually happen. The counterfactual sentence “if we did 
not have a drink, we would have caught the train” is a subtractive counterfactual sentence. 
Also, the counterfactual sentence “if I studied instead of playing video game, I would have 
passed this exam” is a substitutive counterfactual sentence. Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, 
and McMullen (1993) classified counterfactual thinking into upward and downward 
counterfactual thinking.  Upward counterfactual thinking focuses on how past outcomes 
could have been better. For example, athletes can generate upward counterfactual thoughts 
like “If we did more practice, we could have won the match”. Downward counterfactual 
thinking focuses on how past outcomes could have been worse. For example, athletes can 
also generate downward counterfactual thoughts like “We would have lost the game if we did 
not practice”.  
1.2.2. Function of Counterfactual Thinking 
According to the research on functions of counterfactual thinking, the functions 
include the preparatory function and non-preparatory function (Byrne, 2016; Roese & 
Epstude, 2008). Many studies had focused on the preparatory function of counterfactual 
thinking, such as the functional theory (Roese & Epstude, 2008) (I will discuss the functional 
theory in detail in the section 1.2.3.). For the non-preparatory functions, many studies had 
focused on the emotional function of counterfactual thinking. For example, upward 
counterfactual thinking can lead to negative emotions, while downward counterfactual 
thinking can lead to positive emotions (Roese, 1997). For the same event, different 
counterfactual thinking can lead to different emotions. Niedenthal, Tangney, and Gavanski 
(1994) found that thinking counterfactually about personality would be likely to lead to 




However, previous research had overlooked other non-preparatory functions of 
counterfactual thinking. Therefore in this thesis I will discuss some non-preparatory functions 
of speculative thinking that have not been widely discussed, which are the function of 
conveying information, and the function of supporting lying. 
1.2.3. Functional Theory of Counterfactual Thinking 
 
The functional theory of counterfactual thinking was proposed by Epstude and Roese 
(2008). This theory focused on how counterfactual thinking affects subsequent behaviours. 
The functional theory suggests that when people fail to achieve one goal, they will try harder 
to achieve this goal in future. According to the functional theory (Epstude & Roese, 2008), 
this function of counterfactual thinking to change future behaviours is the preparatory 
function. Specifically, although counterfactual thinking is about events that have happened in 
the past, it has the function to prepare for future events. Epstude & Roese (2008) proposed 
that counterfactuals affect future behaviors through the content-specific pathway and the 
content-neutral pathway (n.b. I return to the two pathways proposed in the functional theory 
in the later paragraphs). People who think counterfactually can usually infer the antecedents 
of the outcome, resulting in an intention to change, and finally a change in behavior. 
Some researchers suggested that counterfactual thinking can lead to behavioral 
regulation because of comparison. For example, Medvec, Madey and Gilovich (1995) 
explored the emotional reactions of the silver and bronze medal winners of the 1992 Summer 
Olympics. They found that the bronze medal winners were happier than the silver medal 
winners, because the bronze medal winners compared themselves with the players who did 
not win any medals. The feelings of bronze medal winners focused on how things could have 
been worse (i.e. “I would have not won any medal if I focused less”), which is downward 




gold medal winners. The feeling of silver medal winner focused on that how things could 
have been better (i.e. “I could have won the gold medal if I took different strategies”), which 
is upward counterfactual thinking.  
1.2.3.1. Content-Specific Pathway 
According to the functional theory, people use a content specific pathway to generate 
specific behavioural intentions from their counterfactual thoughts. These intentions can then 
affect subsequent behaviours. For example, if a person gets wet in the rain, then this person 
might think counterfactually that “I could have avoided this if I remembered to bring an 
umbrella”, and in future she/he will bring an umbrella to avoid getting wet. The content 
specific pathway suggests that, in counterfactual thoughts, specific information related to the 
situation can lead to subsequent behavioural intentions, which can lead to changes in future 
behaviours.   
Smallman and Roese (2009) used a sequential priming paradigm to study how 
counterfactual thoughts affect behavioural intention. Specifically, participants read a negative 
event (e.g., milk spilled on the floor). Then in the counterfactual trial, participants read a 
counterfactual statement on screen (e.g., “I could have been more careful”); while in the 
control trial, participants needed to evaluate whether this negative event happens frequently 
in their life. After that, all participants needed to make a behavioural intention judgement by 
indicating “yes” or “no”. For example, participants saw a behavioural intention like “in future 
I will be more careful” on screen and indicated “yes” or “no”. Participants reading 
counterfactual statements showed shorter reaction time for the behavioural intention 
judgment, compared to participants who did not read counterfactual statements. This result 
suggests that the participants who read counterfactual statements found it easier to generate 
behaviour intention than the participants who did not read counterfactual statements. 




behaviour can help us to better understand how the behavioural motivation generated by 
counterfactual thinking can lead to actual behaviour change. Webb and Sheeran (2006) 
conducted a meta-analysis about the relationship between behavioural intentions and actual 
behaviours, although this study did not explicitly talk about counterfactual thinking. In the 
meta-analysis of 47 experiments, half of participants were asked to make explicit a 
behavioural intention about something specific, and other half of participants did not have a 
behavioural intention. Results of the meta-analysis showed that participants who had a 
behaviour intention were more likely to conduct subsequent behaviours than participants who 
did not have a behaviour intention. Brandstätter, Lengfelder and Gollwitzer (2001) also 
explored the relationship between behavioural intention and actual behaviours. Researchers 
chose one group of opiate withdrawal participants (i.e. high cognitive load) and one group of 
opiate post-withdrawal participants (i.e. low cognitive load). All participants were told that 
their task was to compose their vitae. Then half of the participants were told to generate a 
plan that was not related to the main task. The other half of participants generated a plan that 
was related to the main task. The results showed that even under high cognitive load, 
participants having specific behavioural intentions related to the task were more likely to do 
the task (i.e. composing vitae) than participants having no specific behavioural intention.  
1.2.3.2. Content Neutral Pathway 
Through the content-specific pathway, information in counterfactual thinking only 
affects subsequent behaviours that are associated with the specific information. Through the 
content neutral pathway, counterfactual thinking can affect people’s motivation and emotion, 
and thus affect people’s behaviours. Kray et al. (2006) demonstrated that counterfactuals that 
are not related to the task can still lead to better task performance. Researchers assigned 
participants to either counterfactual or non-counterfactual group. Participants in different 




participants completed a logical reasoning task that was not related to the stories. Results 
showed that participants in the counterfactual group performed better in the logical reasoning 
task than the non-counterfactual group.  
Kray and Galinsky (2003) suggested that counterfactual mindset can be effective in 
promoting group decision making. Participants were assigned to counterfactual or non-
counterfactual groups. The counterfactual group read a story about a protagonist who 
changed her seat number, and a lottery result was her previous seat number (i.e. She could 
have won the lottery). The non-counterfactual group read a similar story, in which a 
protagonist did not change her seat number and did not win the lottery. After reading this 
pilot story that is unrelated to the main task, all participants imagined they were in the 
decision-making team after the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, and they needed to seek 
information to make right decision. Specifically, participants needed to find the relationship 
between temperature and engine failure of Space Shuttle, and then decide to stop launching 
the shuttle. Results showed that participants assigned to counterfactual condition were more 
likely to make right decisions than participants in non-counterfactual thinking condition. 
Kray, Galinsky, and Wong (2006) suggested that, by identifying and criticizing information 
that is critical for group decision making, counterfactual mindset can improve the accuracy of 
group decision-making, and help team cooperation.  
By thinking counterfactually about events, people can think about how to avoid a 
negative outcome. Through this process, self-efficacy, self-control, and overconfidence would 
change. For example, when a teacher educates a student, the teacher is not only educating, 
but also experiencing the feeling that the situation is under control. This feeling of control is 
can be helpful for improving future education of that student. Nasco and Marsh (1999) 
explored how counterfactual thinking leads to the sense of control, and then leads to better 




outcome could have been different. Then one month later participants recalled their 
counterfactual thoughts, and they were told that they will take a second exam. Participants 
were then assessed how much control they have over the next exam. Results showed that 
participants who did upward counterfactual thinking after the first exam perceived more 
control over the exam than participants who did downward counterfactual thinking. This 
perception of control was in turn positively correlated with subsequent performance in the 
second exam. In general, functional theory takes into account the factors like mentality, 
motivation, etc., and emphasizes the role of counterfactual thinking in regulating behaviours.  
1.2.4. Determinants of Counterfactual Thinking 
Early research on counterfactual thinking focused on what determinants can lead to 
counterfactual thinking (e.g. Kahneman & Miller, 1986). For example, Kahneman and 
Tversky (1981) found that an exceptional outcome that people did not expect to happen is 
more likely to lead people to think counterfactually than normal outcome that is in line with 
people’s expectations. In one experiment, researchers asked participants to read both an 
exceptional or unexceptional story, and answer in which story the protagonist was more likely 
to think counterfactually. The exceptional story was that protagonist chose an exceptional 
route to home but suffered an accident; the unexceptional story was that protagonist chose a 
usual route to home but suffered an accident. Results showed that participants suggested the 
protagonist in the exceptional story was more likely to think counterfactually than the 
protagonist in the unexceptional story.  
Last paragraph discussed the impact of exceptional events on counterfactual thinking. 
In addition, there were studies focusing on the effect of negative outcome valence on 
counterfactual thinking. For example, Landman (1987) suggested that negative outcome is 
more likely to lead to counterfactual thinking than positive outcome, finding participants who 




than participants who had positive outcome. She suggested that this is because negative 
outcome is more likely to be exceptional outcome than positive outcome. Davis, Lehman, 
Wortman, Silver, and Thompson (1995) did a long term research to study people who 
suffered traumatic event of losing their spouse or children. Participants were interviewed after 
they lost their spouse or children in a traffic accident. Researchers found that negative 
emotion reported by participants can accurately predict participants’ frequency of 
counterfactual thoughts.  
Roese (1997) suggested that the generation of counterfactual thinking can be divided 
into the activation stage and the content stage. Activation of counterfactual thinking refers to 
whether a person thinks counterfactually or not when encountering an event, and content of 
counterfactual thinking refers to the specific idea of people’s counterfactual thoughts. For 
example, when a person was very close to catch a plane, he may think about how things 
could have been different next time, which is the activation of counterfactual thinking. 
Furthermore, counterfactual thoughts generated by this person may be “if I went out earlier I 
could have been able to catch the plane”, which is the content of counterfactual thinking. 
According to Roese (1997), the content of counterfactual thinking can be varied, but it can 
only be either activated or not in the activation stage. Roese (1997) also suggested that, 
different counterfactual determinants may affect these two stages differently. In general, 
outcome valence is the main determinant of counterfactual thinking activation, and 
exceptionality is the main determinant of counterfactual thinking content. 
1.2.5. Understanding Counterfactual Statements 
Byrne (2002) suggested that that people follow some principles to understand 
counterfactuals, due to the limitations of working memory (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). 
One principle is that people hold in the mind only the true possibilities when reading 




earlier, I could have been able to get the delivery”, people represent the true possibilities “If I 
came earlier, then I got the delivery”, and “If I did not come earlier, then I did not get the 
delivery”. However, people do not hold any false possibilities in mind, such as “If I came 
home later, then I got the delivery”. Also, when reading counterfactual conditionals, people 
can understand what is false, but would have been true (Byrne, 1997), which is counterfactual 
reasoning. For instance, people would store two possibilities for the counterfactual statement 
that “he could have chosen the usual routes”. One possibility is the presupposed fact that the 
protagonist did not choose the usual route. The other possibility is that the protagonist chose 
the usual route, which was possible in the past. 
De Vega, Urrutia and Riffo (2007) explored the difference between processing 
counterfactual and factual information. They asked participants to read a story about one 
protagonist buying a lottery ticket. The story started with a context about a protagonist 
hearing lottery information from a radio, followed by either a factual or counterfactual 
sentence. The counterfactual sentence was “If Mary had won the lottery, she would have 
bought a Mercedes car”. The factual sentence was “As Mary had won the lottery, the first 
thing she did was to buy a Mercedes car”. Finally, participants read the outcome of story. The 
outcome was either about the protagonist tearing up the lottery ticket, or about the protagonist 
sitting in the car and felt like a queen. Participants’ reading time for the story was measured. 
The results showed that when the final outcome was about the protagonist tearing up the 
lottery ticket, participants had shorter reading time for the story with counterfactual sentence 
than the story with factual sentence. However, when the final outcome was about the 
protagonist sitting in the car and felt like a queen, participants had shorter reading time for 
the story with factual sentence than the story with counterfactual sentence. These results 
suggested that after reading counterfactual statements, both factual and counterfactual 




will only disappear when the final outcome occurs. 
Ferguson and Jayes (2018) explored the factors that affect people processing 
counterfactuals. They asked participants to read a counterfactual sentence about a person 
preparing dinner. The counterfactual sentence was written in either first person or third 
person perspective. The researchers also controlled the plausibility of the sentences, including 
the plausible, implausible, and anomalous versions of the counterfactual sentences. This 
study was a two (self / other perspective) by three (plausible / implausible / anomalous 
counterfactuals) design. For example, for the “other-anomalous” version, participants read “if 
Sophie had used a pump, she would have prepared the carrots in time for dinner”; for the 
“self-plausible” version, participants read “if you had used a knife, you would have prepared 
the carrots in time for dinner”; while for the “implausible” versions, participants read the 
protagonist used axe to prepare dinner. Participants’ reading time was measured. Results 
showed that participants had shorter reading time when reading plausible counterfactual 
sentence than the implausible and anomalous counterfactual sentences. However, there was 
no difference in reading time between reading the first person and third person perspectives 
of counterfactual sentences. This implausibility effect reflects that people have more 
difficulty processing implausible / anomalous information than plausible information.  
1.3. This Thesis 
Previous research focuses on the function of counterfactual thinking, but rarely 
compares the functional differences between counterfactual thinking and prefactual thinking 
(important exceptions e.g. Ferrante, Girotto, Stragà and Walsh (2013) informed the research 
in comparing counterfactual and prefacutual thinking. See chapter 4 for details). In addition, 
most functional research only focuses on the narrow sense of counterfactual thinking, and 
does not pay attention to the difference between the general speculative thinking for the past 




function of general speculative thinking. On the one hand, this thesis explores the preparatory 
function for future events. Central to the functional theory (Epstude & Roese, 2008) is that 
counterfactual thinking has the function of leading to a behavioural intention to change, and 
finally the change in future behaviour, which is the preparatory function. On the other hand, 
this thesis also explores other non-preparatory functions of speculative thinking (i.e. 
conveying information, supporting lies).  
Chapter 2 discusses the function of counterfactual thinking that it can convey 
information from others’ counterfactuals. Specifically, this chapter includes four experiments, 
all of which required participants to make inferences based on reading others’ 
counterfactuals. I explored whether people can infer the closeness, controllability, and 
exceptionality from others’ counterfactuals. In chapter 3, I take a step back from the narrow 
sense of counterfactual thinking, moving to the perspective of general speculative thinking 
for the past and future. Specifically, based on the theory related to abstractness in speculative 
thinking (i.e. construal level theory), I explore how abstract or specific the descriptions are 
when thinking of and describing past and future events. Chapter 3 compares the differences 
in the degree of abstraction between speculative thinking about the past and future, which 
helps to understand temporal asymmetry in speculative thinking. I further discuss how 
different levels of abstractness when thinking about the past and future may serve the 
preparatory function. In chapter 4, three experiments explored the different dimensions that 
general speculative thinking has, and the different preparatory functions that different 
dimensions in general speculative thinking serve. Specifically, this chapter explores the 
temporal asymmetry in general speculative thinking. In chapter 5, based on previous research 
suggesting counterfactual thinking can support lying, I use controllability to explore the 
relationship between counterfactual thinking and lying.  




thinking perspective. Broadly, this thesis (i.e. chapters 2 and 5) explores whether speculative 
thinking serves functions beyond the traditional preparatory function (i.e., the function to 
convey information through others’ counterfactuals, and the function of generating lies), and 
compares the functions of speculative thinking of the past and future (i.e. the chapters 3 and 
4). I discuss the application and limitations of traditional functional theory of counterfactual 
thinking, and suggest that a broader functional theory is needed to cover all speculative 
thinking of the past and future. In summary, my thesis will add evidence to functions of 
general speculative thinking, from perspectives of temporal asymmetry, traditional 
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Previous counterfactual experiments demonstrated that closeness, controllability, and 
exceptionality are more likely to lead participants to have counterfactual thoughts than 
distance, uncontrollability, and normality. In four experiments I explored the inferences 
people make when they learn that counterfactual thinking has occurred, specifically the 
relation between counterfactual thinking and closeness, controllability, and exceptionality. 
Experiment 1 (N=40) showed that knowing that a protagonist had engaged in counterfactual 
thinking (compared to no counterfactual thinking) resulted in participants inferring that the 
past event was closer in time to the protagonist, but there was no difference in inferring how 
close the past event was between knowing that a protagonist made many and single 
counterfactual(s). Experiment 2 (N = 80) demonstrated that participants were not affected by 
the number of counterfactual statements they read when inferring temporal closeness. 
Experiment 3 (N = 49) demonstrated that participants who learned that a protagonist had 
engaged in counterfactual thinking (compared to no counterfactual thinking) were more 
likely to infer that the protagonist experienced the controllable event, but participants were 
not affected by the number of counterfactual statements they read when inferring 
controllability. Experiment 4 (N = 120) indicated that participants who learned that a 
protagonist had engaged in counterfactual thinking (compared to no counterfactual thinking) 
were more likely to infer that the protagonist experienced the exceptional event, while 
participants were not affected by the number of counterfactual statements they read when 
inferring exceptionality. I concluded that the existence (but not the number) of counterfactual 
thoughts can lead people to infer that event is close, exceptional, and controllable, which 
suggests that the relations between closeness / controllability / exceptionality and 
counterfactual thinking is bidirectional. These results showed that as well as making 




world, based on hypothetical worlds.  
2.2. Introduction 
Counterfactual thinking is the mental simulation of events that could have occurred in 
the past but did not (Decety & Ingvar, 1990; Kahneman & Tversky, 1981). To think 
counterfactually one must ignore events that have occurred, and represent the alternative that 
might have occurred instead (Roese, 1997). Counterfactual thinking often takes the form of 
counterfactual conditionals “if ..., then ....” (Stalnaker, 1999). For example, we might hear the 
counterfactual conditional that “If you had not bought the blue dress, you would have bought 
the red one”. Research has mapped out the events that prompt people to engage in 
counterfactual thinking (e.g. Meyers-Levy & Maheswaran, 1992), but here, I explored the 
inferences people make after knowing that counterfactual thinking has occurred. 
There is already a relatively small literature on what people understand when reading 
counterfactuals. Researchers have mainly used sentence probe tasks (e.g. De Vega & Urrutia, 
2012; De Vega, Urrutia, & Riffo, 2007) or measured participants’ reading times  to explore 
what people understand when reading counterfactuals (e.g. Ferguson, 2012; Ferguson & 
Jayes, 2018; Ferguson and Sanford, 2008; Ferguson, Sanford & Leuthold, 2008; Santamaria, 
Espino & Byrne, 2005). For example, in Ferguson (2012), participants read a story starting 
with either factual sentence (e.g., “Because Joanne had remembered her umbrella, she had 
avoided the rain.”) or a counterfactual sentence (e.g., “If Joanne had remembered her 
umbrella, she would have avoided the rain.”). Participants then read sentences that were 
consistent or inconsistent with the starting sentence. This experiment had three conditions, 
which were the factual-consistent, counterfactual-consistent, and counterfactual-inconsistent 
conditions. For example, in the counterfactual-consistent condition participants read 
“Joanne’s hair was wet” after reading the counterfactual sentence “If Joanne had remembered 




condition participants read “Joanne’s hair was dry” after reading the counterfactual sentence. 
Participants’ reading time was measured. Participants had shorter reading time when reading 
factual-consistent story than the counterfactual-consistent or counterfactual-inconsistent 
story, and there was no difference in reading time between reading the counterfactual-
consistent story and counterfactual-inconsistent story. These results showed that it is more 
difficult for people to process counterfactual information than factual information, reflecting 
that readers of counterfactual information need to take into account both counterfactual and 
factual information. 
Santamaría, Espino, & Byrne (2005) primed participants with counterfactual or 
indicative conditional statements, e.g. “If there had been roses, then there would have been 
lilies” or “If there were roses, then there were lilies” and recorded how long they took to read 
subsequent conjunctions e.g. “There were roses and there were lilies”. When participants read 
the counterfactual conditional they were quicker to read a negative conjunction “There were 
no roses and there were no lilies” than when they had been primed by an indicative 
conditional. However, reading times for positive conjunctions “There were roses and there 
were lilies” were equally fast for both priming conditions. This is interpreted as showing that 
when people read a counterfactual conditional they hold in mind two possibilities (p and q, & 
not p and not q). In contrast, on reading an indicative conditional, people tend to represent 
only one possibility (p and q). When people read counterfactuals, they hold additional 
information in mind compared to when they read indicative statements. A further experiment 
(Ferguson & Sanford, 2008) showed that people make inferences that are consistent within 
the counterfactual world they are considering. For example, participants read a counterfactual 
statement (“If cats were vegetarians…”) followed by a continuation that was either consistent 
with the counterfactual world (but not reality) e.g. “Families could feed their cat a bowl of 




reality) e.g. “Families could feed their cat a bowl of fish”. The first pass reading times for 
these sentences showed that people were slower to read information that was inconsistent 
with their real world knowledge (carrots). However, the inconsistency was quickly 
‘neutralised’ and participants were quicker to read the continuations that were consistent with 
the world they were set in, regardless of their absolute relation to reality. 
These experiments (e.g. Ferguson, 2012; Ferguson & Sanford, 2008; Santamaría, 
Espino, & Byrne, 2005) showed that people represent different alternative possibilities in 
mind when understanding counterfactual information compared to factual information, and 
that they generate inferences consistent with the counterfactual world. In this chapter, I went 
beyond this by looking at whether the inferences that people drawn might be biased. We 
already know that determinants exist that influence the tendency to engage in counterfactual 
thinking. Would people’s inferences be influenced in a similar way? Specifically, we know 
that the tendency to engage in counterfactual thinking is more likely when there are particular 
determinants: these include closeness (e.g. Medvec, Madey, & Gilovich, 1995; Medvec & 
Savitsky, 1997; Meyers-Levy & Maheswaran, 1992), controllability (e.g. Markman, 
Gavanski, Sherman, & McMullen, 1995; Wrosch & Heckhausen, 2002), and exceptionality 
(e.g. Gavanski & Wells, 1989; Kahneman & Tversky, 1981). This chapter studied how 
reading counterfactuals can lead to inferences about closeness, controllability, and 
exceptionality. Previous counterfactual research has widely demonstrated that these three 
determinants can lead to counterfactual thinking. Therefore, I chose these determinants to 
explore inferences about determinants based on knowing counterfactuals. 
Closeness refers to the gap between the actual outcome of an event and the expected 
outcome that might have occurred. Closeness can refer to temporal closeness (e.g. missing a 
flight by just 5 minutes rather than 1 hour), spatial closeness (e.g. being robbed when only 




ticket number 99 in a lottery when number 100 wins the prize). For example, previous 
experiments (e.g, Meyers-Levy & Maheswaran, 1992, Roese & Olson, 1996 experiment 3) 
showed that temporal closeness to the expected outcome was more likely to lead to 
counterfactual thinking than temporal distance. Meyers-Levy and Maheswaran (1992) asked 
participants to read a story describing an apartment fire that occurred after three days (i.e. 
temporal closeness) or six months (i.e. temporal distance) after the owner had forgotten to 
buy insurance. The results suggested that, compared with the participants who read the story 
about the fire 6 months later, participants who read the material about the fire 3 days later 
were more likely to attribute counterfactual thinking to the story protagonist. In other 
experiments (e.g. Roese & Olson, 1996), a story described a frustrated protagonist who failed 
to catch a plane by only 5 minutes (i.e. temporal closeness) or 1 hour (i.e. temporal distance). 
Critically, in the story the airport staff informed the protagonist that the plane had taken off at 
the scheduled departure time (i.e. 1 hour before) or just 5 minutes before the protagonist 
arrived the airport, so the two protagonists’ efforts to get to the airport on time were the same. 
The participants were asked to write down their thoughts about this story. Participants were 
more likely to generate counterfactual thoughts for the protagonist who missed the plane by 
only five minutes, i.e. was closer to catching it. Roese (1997) argued that the functional 
nature of counterfactual thinking means that we pay attention to events that almost happened, 
because these are ones we are likely to benefit from attempting to change in the future. 
However, it is important to note that Gilbert, Morewedge, Risen, and Wilson (2004) 
suggested that while the effect of closeness is seen when participants imagine hypothetical 
scenarios, the impact is not so strong (or does not exist) when people actually experience the 
events.  
As for controllability, many researchers (e.g. Girotto, Legrenzi, & Rizzo, 1991) 




than uncontrollable events. For example, Girotto, Legrenzi,  and Rizzo (1991) asked 
participants to generate counterfactual thoughts for one protagonist who was delayed by both 
controllable events (e.g. having a drink) and uncontrollable events (e.g. road blocked by a 
flock of sheep), and when the protagonist came home he found his wife just died because of 
heart attack. Researchers found that participants’ counterfactual thoughts mainly focused on 
the protagonist’s controllable action (e.g. “he could have come home earlier and saved his 
wife if he did not have a drink”). Mandel and Lehman (1996) asked participants to read a 
story about a protagonist suffering a car accident. Participants then needed to generate 
counterfactual thoughts for the protagonist. Results showed that participants’ counterfactual 
thoughts mainly focused on the controllable actions that protagonist did (e.g. “he should have 
chosen another route”). The functional theory of counterfactual thinking (Epstude & Roese, 
2008) suggested that counterfactual thinking is helpful for improving future behaviors. 
Following this vein, the reason why counterfactual thinking focuses on controllable than 
uncontrollable events is that people can only make efforts to improve controllable events in 
the future. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1981) suggested that people are more likely to think 
counterfactually about the exceptional events than the unexceptional events, demonstrating 
that exceptionality leads to counterfactual thinking. Researchers used two versions of stories 
both about a protagonist who suffered a car accident on the way home. One version of the 
story was that the protagonist left his office at an exceptional time, and stuck to his usual 
route. The other version of story was the protagonist left his office at the usual time, but he 
chose an exceptional route to go home. Participants thought counterfactually about how this 
protagonist could have been able to avoid this car accident. Results showed that participants’ 
counterfactual thoughts were more likely to focus on the exceptional than normal time or 




to read a story about a student taking an exam. Participants read the story that either had 
exceptional outcome (i.e., the outstanding student did not pass the exam) or unexceptional 
outcome (i.e., the outstanding student passed the exam). The story also included some 
exceptional (e.g. mother was suddenly sick) and unexceptional events (e.g., the student was 
normally nervous before the exam). Counterfactual thinking generated by participants in the 
exceptional condition was more likely to focus on the exceptional event than counterfactual 
thinking generated by participants in the unexceptional condition. 
Previous experiments have looked at what prompts counterfactual thinking. However, 
to our knowledge none have addressed whether knowledge of counterfactual thinking leads to 
inferring that the event was more likely to be a near miss, controllable, and exceptional. If 
closeness, controllability, and exceptionality to the expected outcome can lead to 
counterfactual thinking, the reverse pattern might be also true. This question about what 
inferences people draw is important, because people not only engage in counterfactual 
thinking themselves, they also hear other people express counterfactual thoughts and need to 
interpret them. Interpreting others’ counterfactual thoughts allows people to make inferences 
about the original event. Thus, it is possible that I could influence participants’ estimates of 
the closeness, controllability, and exceptionality by manipulating participants’ exposure to 
counterfactual thinking.  
Hence, in four experiments I explored whether knowledge of another’s counterfactual 
thinking leads people to make inferences about closeness, controllability, and exceptionality: 
the reverse of the established effect that closeness, controllability, and exceptionality lead 
people to engage in counterfactual thought (or infer that others would engage in 
counterfactual thought). I tested two possibilities 1) that there may be differences in 
inferences based on whether characters made statements about counterfactuals or just about 




counterfactuals) would affect the likelihood of drawing such an inference. Because there are 
these two possibilities, I used two experiments to test the two possibilities separately when 
exploring the first determinant (i.e. closeness) in this chapter, in order to direct the following 
experiments (i.e. controllability and exceptionality experiments) in this chapter. 
Specifically, in Experiment 1, based on previous closeness experiments (i.e. Meyers-
Levy & Maheswaran, 1992; Roese & Olson, 1996 experiment 3), I tested the possibility that 
whether there may be differences in inferences about closeness based on whether characters 
made statements about counterfactuals or just about reality. Although Experiment 1 did 
include conditions involving single and multiple counterfactuals, participants themselves did 
not directly compare single counterfactual with multiple counterfactuals. In Experiment 2, I 
tested the possibility whether the extent of the thinking described (multiple versus single 
counterfactuals) would affect the likelihood of drawing inference about closeness. In 
Experiment 1, participants drew inferences from directly reading and comparing 
counterfactual and reality statements, but did not draw inferences from directly reading and 
comparing multiple and single counterfactual statements. Therefore, the difference between 
reading multiple and single counterfactual statements may be hidden. To test the inferences 
from directly reading and comparing multiple and single counterfactual statements, in 
Experiment 2 I made direct contrast between reading multiple and single counterfactual 
statements. In Experiment 3, based on Girotto, et al. (1991) who demonstrated that 
controllability can lead people to think counterfactually, I hypothesized that the existence of 
counterfactual thinking can lead participants to infer that the event was controllable. Also, 
based on Kahneman and Tversky (1981) demonstrating that exceptional event can lead 
participant to think counterfactually, in Experiment 4 I hypothesized that the existence of 
counterfactual thinking lead participants to infer that event was exceptional. Overall, my goal 




and counterfactual determinants. This goal will be achieved by testing whether participants 
can infer counterfactual determinants from reading counterfactuals. 
2.3. Experiment 1: Closeness  
In Experiment 1, I explored the possible bidirectional relation between closeness and 
counterfactual thinking, by studying whether reading counterfactuals can lead to inferring 
closeness. Specifically, I tested whether there may be differences in inferring closeness 
between reading counterfactual and reality statements. I had two hypotheses in Experiment 1. 
Firstly I hypothesized that knowing a protagonist made statement(s) about counterfactuals 
will result in participants inferring that the past event was closer in time compared to a 
protagonist who made statement about reality. Secondly I hypothesized that knowing a 
protagonist made many counterfactuals will result in participants inferring that the past event 
was closer in time compared to a protagonist who made single counterfactual. 
2.3.1. Method 
2.3.1.1. Participants 
42 psychology students (36 women, 6 men) from the University of Birmingham in 
Birmingham in the UK participated in Experiment 1 to gain course credits.  
Participants in all experiments reported in this thesis gave consent and all experiments 
were approved by the STEM Ethics Review Committee of the University of Birmingham. No 
individual participated in more than one experiment reported in this chapter. Participants 
across my four experiments were predominantly female (78.8 – 91.3%), reflecting the student 
cohort from which they were recruited. 




There were two conditions in Experiment 1: a many counterfactuals condition who 
read about a character generating several counterfactual statements about the event, and a 
single counterfactual condition who read about one generating just one counterfactual 
statement about the event. Each condition also read a second version of the story with a 
character who made no counterfactual statement. Instead, this character made a statement that 
described reality. Each condition read a pair of plane stories (counterfactual and reality) and a 
pair of fire stories (counterfactual and reality).  
The plane story was adapted from Roese & Olson (1996, experiment 3). In the 
original, airport staff informed the protagonist that the plane had taken off at 1 hour or 5 
minutes before the protagonist arrived the airport. I removed this information about timing 
and added the protagonist’s own comment on the events at the end of the story containing 
either many counterfactuals (many counterfactuals version), a single counterfactual (single 
counterfactual version), or a reality statement (reality version). The second story about an 
apartment fire was adapted from Meyers-Levy & Maheswaran (1992, experiment 2). In the 
original the protagonist’s apartment suffered a fire 3 days (or 6 months) after he forgot to 
send the fire insurance application. This information was removed and I added either many 
counterfactuals (many counterfactuals version), a single counterfactual (single counterfactual 
version), or a reality statement (reality version) as a comment from the protagonist at the end 
of the story. In Experiment 1, I used same reality statement in both many and single 
counterfactuals conditions. The stories are included in the Appendix A. 
Because I did not predict any difference between the stories I fixed their order (plane 
always first). I also fixed the order in which the versions of the stories were presented such 
that participants all have many/single version first in plane story and reality version first in 
fire story. It is worth mentioning that many previous counterfactual thinking experiments 




example, Roese and Olson (1996) used two similar stories that the protagonist was informed 
that the plane had taken off at 1 hour or 5 minutes before, to study how different temporal 
distances influence counterfactual thinking. Similarly, Kahneman and Tversky (1981) used 
two stories about a protagonist experiencing an exceptional or unexceptional event before the 
car accident, to study how exceptionality influences counterfactual thinking. 
In summary, the comparison between counterfactual and reality statements was tested 
in all participants, but half the participants compared many counterfactuals and reality and 
half compared a single counterfactual and reality. 
2.3.1.3. Procedure 
The experimenter greeted the participants and asked them to complete the consent 
form. Participants completed the experiment in a quiet room alone. 
After reading the pair of plane story versions (i.e. “many” and “reality”, or “single” 
and “reality”), participants were asked, “Although you cannot tell for sure from the reading 
materials, judging from what Michael/John said, who was closer to catching the flight?” Then 
they were asked “Please give any reasons why you think the protagonist who you chose (i.e. 
Michael or John) was closer to catching the flight?” Matched questions were used for the fire 
story, “Although you cannot tell for sure from the reading materials, judging from what 
Greg/Jack said, who might have been closer to remembering to send in the policy on time 
(i.e. the time the fire occurred was closer to the time that he forgot to send in the policy)?”, 
and “Please give any reasons why you think the protagonist who you choose (i.e. Greg or 
Jack) might have been closer to remembering to send in the policy on time?”. 
Participants were thanked and debriefed. 
2.3.2. Results & Discussions  




Science Framework website 
(https://osf.io/wxhr3/?view_only=a2b14110abbb4de6bbafe12bfcae8959). Data for 
Experiment 1 are summarized in Table 1. First, I made a comparison between the many and 
single conditions. There was no difference in the pattern of choosing the counterfactual or 
reality versions of the stories between the many and single conditions: plane story, Fisher’s 
Exact Test (1, N = 42) p > .999, Cramer’s V = .06; fire story, Fisher’s Exact Test (1, N = 42) p 
= .697, Cramer’s V = .12. 
Second, I explored whether participants were more likely to attribute temporal 
closeness to the protagonists making counterfactual statements, using binomial tests to 
compare the responses in each condition. For the plane story participants were more likely to 
say that Michael (who made counterfactual statements) had missed the plane by a shorter 
time than John (who made a reality-based statement), many condition: p = .027, single 
condition p = .007; for the fire story, participants were more likely to say that Jack (who 
made counterfactual statements) might have been closer to remember to send in the policy 






Table 1. Number of participants inferring that the counterfactual version or reality 
version was closer in time 
 
Version judged to be close 
counterfactual reality 
Plane Story Single 17 4 
 Many 16 5 
Fire Story Single    16 5 
 Many    18 3 
 
To sum up, in Experiment 1 I found that the existence of counterfactual thoughts 
(compared to their absence) did lead participants to infer temporal closeness, but there was no 
difference in the pattern of choosing the counterfactual or reality versions of the stories 
between the many and single conditions. Therefore I found a difference in inferences about 
temporal distance based on whether there were (or were not) any counterfactual statements in 
the story. The results suggest the existence of counterfactual thoughts can lead participants to 
infer that events are closer than the absence of counterfactual thoughts. However, multiple 
counterfactuals did not lead participants to infer that events are closer than single 
counterfactual. These results are plausible because previous experiments did not explore the 
difference in the number of counterfactuals generated from closeness. Specifically, previous 
experiments (e.g. Meyers-Levy & Maheswaran, 1992, Roese & Olson, 1996 experiment 3) 
reported that temporal closeness (compared with temporal distance) was more likely to lead 
participants to engage in counterfactual thinking, rather than temporal closeness resulting in 




of counterfactual statements (compared to their absence) might prime judgements about 
temporal distance. 
The alternative possibility for the lack of a difference between many and single 
counterfactuals might be that Experiment 1 did not allow participants directly to compare 
many counterfactuals with single counterfactual. This lack of direct contrast may hide the 
possible difference between many and single counterfactuals. That is, Experiment 1 only 
allowed participants to compare counterfactuals (many/single) with a reality statement, but 
did not make direct contrast between inferences made after reading multiple and single 
counterfactual statements. Therefore, to minimize the impact of lacking direct contrast on 
participants’ inference, direct comparison between many and single counterfactuals is needed 
in Experiment 2.  
2.4. Experiment 2: Closeness Follow-up  
In Experiment 1, I demonstrated that the existence of counterfactual thoughts led 
participants to infer that events are closer in time. However I did not find a difference in 
inferring closeness based on reading many and single counterfactuals. As I mention above, 
one possibility is that the difference between multiple and single counterfactual statements 
may be hidden because participants did not directly compare multiple counterfactuals with 
single counterfactual. However, an alternative possibility is that there is no difference in 
inferring closeness based on reading many and single counterfactuals. It may be because, 
when someone generates multiple counterfactual thoughts they are simply exploring different 
counterfactual events, but this does not necessarily indicate that the “degree” of 
counterfactual thinking is deeper. Take the plane story as an example, the protagonist’s 
counterfactual statements in the many counterfactuals version story involve mental mutation 
of the departure time (e.g. “I should have left earlier”), the traffic (e.g. “If I thought about the 




(e.g. “If I booked earlier tickets, then I would have avoided this traffic jam”). On the other 
hand, the protagonist’s counterfactual statements in the single counterfactual version story 
only involve mental mutation of the departure time (e.g. “I should have left earlier”), which is 
only one aspect of the counterfactual events. 
Therefore, in Experiment 2 I checked Experiment 1’s results that there was no 
difference in inferring closeness based on reading many and single counterfactuals, by 
making direct contrast between multiple and single counterfactual statements. I hypothesized 
that knowing that a protagonist had generated multiple counterfactuals would result in 
participants inferring that the past event was closer in time compared to a protagonist who 
had generated a single counterfactual. 
2.4.1. Method 
2.4.1.1. Participants 
80 psychology students (63 women, 17 men) from the University of Birmingham 
participated to gain course credits.  
2.4.1.2. Design & Materials 
All participants completed both the many and single statements conditions. Each 
participant read plane and fire counterfactual stories which were same as Experiment 1 (see 
Appendix B). Each story had a “many counterfactuals” version and a “single counterfactual” 
version. I counterbalanced the order of the “many counterfactuals” and “single 
counterfactual” versions, and I fixed the story order of the plane story (always first) and fire 
story. Therefore, each participant read either “single counterfactual” version of plane story 
and “many counterfactuals” version of fire story, or “many counterfactuals” version of plane 
story and “single counterfactual” version of fire story. After reading each story, participant 




reasons. Although participants explained their reason, I have not analysed them and do not 
report it in this thesis. 
2.4.1.3. Procedure 
After reading the many or single counterfactuals version of the plane story (depending 
on their allocated condition), participants were asked “Although you cannot tell for sure from 
the reading material, judging from Michael’s description, when do you think the plane took 
off: A. At the scheduled time, an hour before Michael arrived at the airport; B. 5 minutes 
before Michael arrived at the airport, 55 minutes later than scheduled”. Then participants 
were asked, “Please give any reasons why you think this is when the flight took off before 
Michael arrived”. 
After reading single or many counterfactuals versions of the fire story (the 
complementary version to that read for the plane story), participants were asked “Although 
you cannot tell for sure from the reading material, judging from Greg’s description, when do 
you think the fire occurred: A.3 days after he forgot to send the policy document; B.6 months 
after he forgot to send the policy document.” Participants were then asked, “Please give any 
reasons why you think this is when the fire occurred.” 
After each participant completed the questionnaire, the researchers presented a debrief 
sheet to the participant. 
2.4.2. Results & Discussions 
Data for Experiment 2 are summarized in Table 2. I compared the number of 
participants judging that the missed event was close or distant in time, when they read many 
or single counterfactuals. For the plane story, a Chi Square test (with continuity correction) 
showed that there was no difference in the likelihood of inferring temporal closeness or 




80) = .22, p = .636, Cramer’s V = .08. For the fire story, a Chi Square test (with continuity 
correction) showed that there was no difference in the likelihood of inferring temporal 
closeness or distance, depending on whether participants read many or single counterfactuals, 





Table 2. Number of participants inferring that the event was close or distant in time  
 
Event judged to be 
Close distant 
Plane Story Single 15 25 
 Many 12 28 
Fire Story Single 28 12 
 Many 24 16 
 
To sum up, Experiment 2, as a check on Experiment 1, showed that participants did 
not infer greater temporal closeness when reading stories with multiple counterfactuals rather 
than a single counterfactual. I conclude that there is no difference in inferring closeness 
between multiple and single counterfactuals, instead of that the difference between multiple 
and single counterfactual statements was hidden in Experiment 1. These results were counter 
to the prediction that multiple counterfactuals should be more salient than single 
counterfactual in inferring an outcome was closer.  
2.5. Experiment 3: Controllability  
The functional theory of counterfactual thinking (Epstude & Roese, 2008) suggested 
that counterfactual thinking focusing on controllable events or actions is helpful for 
promoting future performance, because people can only make efforts to improve the 
controllable parts. Girotto et al. (1991) showed that participants thought counterfactually 
when they learned events were controllable. In Experiment 3 I explored if the reverse 
inference is true. Girotto et al. (1991) asked participants to generate counterfactual thoughts 




uncontrollable events (e.g. road blocked by a flock of sheep), finding that participants’ 
counterfactual thoughts mainly focused on protagonist’s controllable action. Based on this, I 
hypothesized that the existence of counterfactual thinking can lead participants to infer that 
the event was controllable. In the original experiment (Girotto, et al., 1991), participants read 
that a protagonist was postponed by some controllable and uncontrollable events, and 
participants’ counterfactual thoughts mainly focused on the uncontrollable events. In 
Experiment 3, I explored participants’ inferences about controllability by presenting 
counterfactual statements or narrative statements to participants. I hypothesized that knowing 
a protagonist made statement(s) about counterfactuals (compared to a protagonist who made 
statement about reality) would be more likely to result in participants inferring that the past 
event was controllable.  
2.5.1. Method 
2.5.1.1. Participants 
Experiment 3 was an online experiment using Sona System. 49 psychology students 
(40 women, 9 men) of the University of Birmingham participated this experiment to gain 
course credits. 
2.5.1.2. Design & Materials  
The results of first two experiments (in which Experiment 1 found that there was 
difference in inference between counterfactuals and reality, while Experiment 2 found that 
there was no difference in inference between many and single counterfactuals) directed the 
design of Experiments 3 and 4. Thus, the design of Experiment 3 was identical to that of 
Experiment 1. There were two conditions in Experiment 3: a many counterfactuals condition 
who read about a character generating several counterfactual statements about the event, and 




statement about the event. Each condition also read a second version of the story with a 
character who made a reality statement. Each condition read a pair of counterfactual 
controllability stories (counterfactual and reality) which adapted from previous experiment 
(Girotto et al., 1991 experiment 1).  
The original story (Girotto et al., 1991 experiment 1) was about a protagonist was 
delayed by some uncontrollable events (e.g. a flock of sheep in the middle of the road) and 
controllable own decisions (e.g. own decision to have a drink), and when he came home he 
found his wife had a heart attack and she was dying. The specific controllable and 
uncontrollable events in the story were concealed, and I added either many counterfactuals 
(many counterfactuals version), a single counterfactual (single counterfactual version), or a 
reality statement (reality version) as a comment from the protagonist at the end of the story. 
(see Appendix C). Participants in the many condition read two versions of the story: one with 
many counterfactuals and one with a reality statement. Participants in the single condition 
read two versions of the story: one with a single counterfactual and one with a reality 
statement. I also counterbalanced the order of the versions (counterfactual or reality 
statements) between stories. In Experiment 3, I used same reality statement in both many and 
single counterfactuals conditions. 
2.5.1.3. Procedure 
Participants first read the pair of controllability story versions (i.e. “many” and 
“reality”, or “single” and “reality”). Participants were then asked, “Although you cannot tell 
for sure from the reading materials, judging from what Mr. Bianchi/Williams said, which 
person was delayed by his own decision to go to a bar?” Then they were asked “Please give 
any reasons why you think the protagonist who you chose (i.e. Mr. Bianchi/Williams) was 
delayed by his own decision to go to a bar whereas the other person was delayed by a flock of 




Finally, participants received online debrief information.  
2.5.2. Results & Discussions 
Data for Experiment 3 are summarized in Table 3. First I made a comparison between 
the many and single conditions. There was no difference in the likelihood of inferring 
controllability between the many and single conditions, Fisher’s Exact Test (1, N = 49) p 
= .495, Cramer’s V = .19.  
Second, I explored whether participants were more likely to attribute controllability to 
the protagonist who made counterfactual statements. In the many condition, a Binomial test 
(p < .001) showed that participants were significantly more likely to say that Mr.Bianchi 
(who made counterfactual statements) was delayed by his own decision to go to a bar than 
Mr. Williams (who made a reality statement). In the single group, a Binomial test (p < .001) 
showed that participants were significantly more likely to say that Mr.Bianchi (who made a 
counterfactual statement) was delayed by his own decision to go to a bar than Mr. Williams 
(who made a reality statement). 
Overall, these results supported my hypothesis that the existence of counterfactual 
thinking can lead participants to infer controllability. These results indicated that, as long as 
counterfactual thinking occurs, there was no significant difference in inferring controllability 





Table 3. Number of participants inferring that the event was controllable 
 
Version judged to be controllable 
counterfactual reality 
Single  25 2 
 
Many     






2.6. Experiment 4: Exceptionality 
In the above experiments, I have explored two types of inference participants made 
from reading counterfactual statements, inferences about closeness and about controllability. 
In Experiment 4, I look at the third type of inference, that is inference about exceptionality. 
Based on Kahneman and Tversky (1981) demonstrating that exceptional event can lead 
participants to think counterfactually, in Experiment 4, I explored whether reading 
counterfactual thoughts would in turn lead to inferring exceptionality. Specifically, I assumed 
that the existence of counterfactual thinking can enable the participants to infer that event was 
exceptional. The experimental paradigm that previous experiments (e.g. Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1981) used was to present participants with a story in which the protagonist 
underwent several exceptional and usual events, and then the protagonist did not obtain the 
expected outcome.  
2.6.1. Method 
2.6.1.1. Participants 
Experiment 4 was also an online experiment using Sona System. 120 psychology 




to gain course credits. 
2.6.1.2. Design & Materials 
Design of Experiment 4 was similar to that of Experiment 1. There were also two 
conditions in Experiment 4: a many counterfactuals condition and a single counterfactual 
condition. Each participant read two counterfactual exceptionality stories which adapted from 
Kahneman and Tversky (1981). The original story was about a protagonist who chose an 
exceptional (or unexceptional) route, however later he unfortunately suffered a traffic 
accident in the route he chose. As in Experiments 1 and 3, in Experiment 4 I also wrote either 
many or single counterfactuals as a character’s own statements, accompanied with another 
story using reality statement as the protagonist’s own statement (see Appendix D). 
Participants in the many condition read two versions of the story: one with many 
counterfactuals and one with a reality statement. Participants in the single condition read two 
versions of the story: one with a single counterfactual and one with a reality statement. I also 
counterbalanced the order of the versions (counterfactual or reality statements) between 
stories. In Experiment 4, I used same reality statement in both many and single 
counterfactuals conditions. 
2.6.1.3. Procedure  
After reading both versions of story, participants were asked “Although you cannot 
tell for sure from the reading materials, judging from what Mr. Jackson/Jones’s wife said, 
which person was more likely to drive home by the exceptional route (rather than stick to the 
regular route that he used to drive)”. Participants then were asked “Please give any reasons 
why you think this person (which you selected) was more likely to drive home by the 
exceptional route (rather than stick to the regular route that he used to drive)”.  




2.6.2. Results & Discussions 
Data for Experiment 4 are summarized in Table 4. First I made a comparison between 
the many and single conditions. A Chi Square test showed that there was no significant 
difference in inferring exceptionality between the many and single conditions, χ2 (1, N= 120) 
= 1.63, p = .202, Cramer’s V = .14.  
Second, I explored whether participants were more likely to attribute exceptionality to 
protagonist who made counterfactual statements. In the many condition, a Binomial test  
showed that participants were more likely to say that Mr. Jones (who made many 
counterfactuals) was more likely to drive home by the exceptional route than Mr. Jackson 
(who made reality statement), p < .001. In the single condition, a Binomial test showed that 
participants were significantly more likely to say that Mr. Jones was more likely to drive 
home by the exceptional route than Mr. Jackson, p =.045. 
Overall, these results supported my hypothesis that the existence of counterfactual 
thinking can lead to inferring exceptionality. These results indicated that, there was no 






Table 4. Number of participants inferring that the event was exceptional 
 
Version judged to be exceptional 
counterfactual reality 
Single  36 20 
 
Many     






2.7. Discussions of Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 4   
To understand how people make inferences based on knowing that someone making 
counterfactual statements, this chapter explored the possible bidirectional relation between 
counterfactuals and counterfactual determinants, which is based on previous research 
demonstrating that closeness, controllability, and exceptionality are more likely to lead 
participants to have counterfactual thoughts than distance, uncontrollability, and normality 
(e.g. Girotto, et al., 1991; Kahneman & Tversky, 1981; Meyers-Levy & Maheswaran, 1992; 
Roese & Olson, 1996). In four experiments I tested whether people infer that the event was 
more likely to be a near miss, controllable, and exceptional when they hear someone using 
counterfactual statements to describe an event. I found that the existence of counterfactual 
thoughts (compared to their absence) did lead participants to infer temporal closeness in 
Experiment 1. Experiment 2, as a check on Experiment 1, demonstrated that there is no 
difference in inferring closeness based on reading multiple and single counterfactuals, rather 
than that the difference between multiple and single counterfactual statements was hidden in 
Experiment 1. Experiment 3 demonstrated that the existence of counterfactual thinking can 




counterfactual thinking can lead people to infer exceptionality.  
To consider the power of my experiments to detect the effects of interest, I compared 
the sample sizes of Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 4 with the sample sizes of previous experiments. 
In Experiment 1 (N = 42 with two conditions) and Experiment 2 (N = 80 with two 
conditions), I adapted Roese and Olson’s experiment (1996, experiment 3) in which they 
recruited 183 participants for two conditions, and I adapted Meyers-Levy and Maheswaran’s 
experiments (1992, experiment 2) in which they recruited 63 participants for two conditions. 
In Experiment 3 (N = 49 with two conditions), I adapted Girotto, et al.’s experiment (1991) in 
which they recruited 108 participants for two conditions. In Experiment 4 (N = 120 with two 
conditions), I adapted Kahneman and Tversky’s experiment (1981) in which they recruited 
123 participants for two conditions. The sample sizes in my experiments are slightly smaller 
than those in previous experiments. It would give me less power to identify a significant 
effect, although in fact I have found the effects. 
In summary, my results suggest that the relation between closeness / controllability / 
exceptionality and counterfactual thinking is bidirectional. I already knew that events that 
were closely missed, controllable, and exceptional lead to counterfactual thinking. I show that 
the reverse pattern is also true: when people hear someone using counterfactual statements to 
describe an event they infer that the event was more likely to be a near miss, controllable, and 
exceptional. My findings advance our knowledge of counterfactual bidirectional relation in 
showing that as well as making counterfactual inferences based on facts about the real world, 
people also make interferences about the real world, based on counterfactual worlds. 
I interpret these results in the light of norm theory (Kahneman & Miller., 1986). A 
norm is general knowledge from and expectation of specific events, which is formed from 
many past experiences. Norm theory suggests that people assess that whether an event is 




expectation. Norm theory further suggests that, the more an event is consistent with general 
knowledge and expectation, the less likely this event would lead to thinking counterfactually. 
In contrast, when an event deviates from the general knowledge and expectation, people will 
evaluate this event to be exceptional. Therefore people will construct how the event could 
match the norm, and thinking counterfactually is how people restore the exceptional event to 
the norm (Kahneman & Miller., 1986). From the norm theory perspective, closeness and 
controllability may be similar to exceptionality. Specifically, controllable or near miss events 
account for relatively small proportion of the various events (i.e., the probability of 
encountering a controllable or near miss event is relatively low). Therefore, the occurrence of 
controllable or near miss events is relatively exceptional.  
In turn, my results showed that reading counterfactuals can lead to inferring closeness, 
controllability, and exceptionality, which may be because people can tell from counterfactuals 
that the original event did not meet the norm. Counterfactual thinking can help to understand 
the norm, indicating how the original event was deviated from the norm. Therefore, the 
specific forms of norm deviation (i.e. closeness, controllability, and exceptionality) can then 
be inferred from counterfactuals.  
2.7.1. Conclusion 
 
In four experiments I explored the inferences people make when they learn that 
counterfactual thinking has occurred. Compared with knowing someone made a statement 
about reality, knowing that someone made counterfactual statements was more likely to lead 
to inferring closeness, controllability, and exceptionality. Previous research showed that 
events that were closely missed, controllable, and exceptional lead to counterfactual thinking, 
and my experiments indicated that the reverse pattern is also true. Together, these results 
indicated that inferential relation between counterfactual thinking and its determinants was 

















This chapter explores speculative thinking about the past and future. Specifically, 
based on construal level theory (i.e. CLT) that discusses abstractness in speculative thinking, 
I explore how abstract or specific the descriptions are when thinking about and describing 
past and future events. CLT suggested that thinking about far psychological distance leads 
people to have more abstract thoughts than close psychological distance; while thinking about 
close psychological distance leads people to have more specific thoughts than far 
psychological distance. CLT also suggested that thinking about different psychological 
distances have different functions. Previous studies have not discussed the difference in 
psychological distance between thinking about the past and future.  
In one experiment (N = 80), I used one open-ended questionnaire and one forced-
choice questionnaire, using two (Close / Far) by two (Past / Future) design. Results of open-
ended questionnaire showed that construal level of describing far psychological distance 
activities were higher than that of describing close psychological distance activities (p 
< .001), and construal level of describing past activities were higher than that of describing 
future activities (p = .041). However, results of the forced-choice questionnaire did not show 
any difference in choosing different construal-level options between Far and Close conditions 
(p = .180), or between Past and Future conditions (p = .073). I concluded that both the far / 
close difference and past / future difference (i.e. temporal asymmetry) can lead people to use 
different levels of construal to represent activities. I discussed whether thinking about the 
future may have closer psychological distance than thinking about the past, and temporal 
asymmetry in abstractness is helpful for understanding the functions of speculative thinking. 
3.2. Introduction 
When people are planning for the future, they can consider a distant future (e.g. in one 




yesterday) or a distant past (e.g. last year). The distant and near events in temporal dimension 
represent different temporal distance. For example, Liberman, Trope, and Wakslak (2007) 
suggested that future temporal distance is related to people’s savings, buying things for future 
use, and taking actions to achieve future goals (e.g. self-control); while events in the past 
tempaoral distance may cause regrets. The dimension of temporal distance is included in 
general psychological distance (e.g. Trope & Liberman, 2003; Trope & Liberman, 2010). 
Construal level theory (CLT) (e.g., Trope & Liberman, 2010) focuses on the effect that 
people’s representation of events is affected by different psychological distance, suggesting 
that the further psychological distance could lead our thinking to be more abstract; and the 
closer psychological distance could lead our thinking to be more specific. Early CLT research 
(e.g., Liberman & Trope, 1998) focused on temporal distance, suggesting people use more 
abstract, general, decontextualized, and goal directed description to represent distant future or 
past events, which is high-level construal. On the contrary, people use the specific, 
contextualized, and means-related features to construe close future or past events, which is 
low-level construal (Liberman & Trope, 1998; Liberman, et al., 2007; Trope & Liberman，
2010). In this chapter, based on previous construal level and temporal asymmetry research 
suggesting thinking about past and future can lead to different temporal distances, I explored 
whether thinking about the past and future would lead to different construal levels.  
The research goal for this thesis is to explore the function of general speculative 
thinking. In this thesis, what I mean by speculative thinking is the thoughts about things that 
are not currently real. Therefore, thinking about events in the future and past with different 
temporal distances are also belongs to the category of speculative thinking. In this chapter, 
exploring the past and future speculative thinking from construal level perspective will add to 
research on general speculative thinking. I am interested in different construal levels because 




behaviors. For example, McCrea, Liberman, Trope, and Sherman (2008) explored the 
relationship between construal level and people’s intention to do action.  Participants in the 
low construal level condition described 10 activities in specific language, while participants 
in the high construal level condition described the 10 activities in abstract language. On a 
scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much), participants then evaluated how convenient it 
would be for them to complete these activities. Participants in the low construal level 
condition rated the activities were more convenient than participants in the high construal 
level condition will not postpone completing these activities. Researchers suggested low 
construal level is less likely to make people to postpone activities than high construal level. 
Combined with CLT, my research on construal levels of speculative thinking about the past 
and future can help us to understand how different construal levels can affect people’s 
behavioral intentions for future events. 
In this chapter, I adapted Liberman and Trope’s experiment (1998) of the relationship 
between temporal distance and construal level. The original experiment is about speculative 
thinking about the future, exploring the different construal levels between speculative 
thinking of the distant and close future. In this chapter, I introduce the speculative thinking of 
the past, exploring whether there are different construal levels between speculative thinking 
of the past and future. Liberman and Trope (1998) suggested that high-construal-level 
descriptions have the structure “[description] by [activity]”, while low-construal-level 
descriptions have the structure “[activity] by [description]”. Taking the activity “spending a 
weekend with family” as an example, a high-level description “improving our relationship” 
fits the high-construal-level structure (i.e., “I improve our relationship by spending a 
weekend with family”) better than the low-construal-level structure. It is strange to say “I 
spend a weekend with family by improving our relationship”). On the other hand, the 




spend a weekend with family by going to the park”) than the high-construal-level structure.  
Liberman and Trope (1998, study 1) used one future-distant condition (i.e. next year) 
and one future-close condition (i.e. tomorrow) to study construal level for thinking about the 
future. The first part of their study was an open-ended questionnaire. Participants described 
some close or distant future activities (e.g. reading a science fiction book). There were more 
high-construal-level descriptions in the future distant condition than the future close 
condition, and there were more low-construal-level descriptions in the future close condition 
than the future distant condition. The second part of this study was the personal agency 
questionnaire adapted from Vallacher and Wegner (1989), which was a forced-choice 
questionnaire. Participants thought about some activities (e.g. making a list) happening in 
tomorrow or next year, and chose the description that they thought was most suitable. One of 
the descriptions was about the means to achieve this activity (e.g. writing things down), and 
the other was about the goals of this activity (e.g. getting organized). According to the 
researchers, the descriptions about means and goals reflect low and high construal levels 
respectively. There were more high-construal-level descriptions chosen in the distant 
condition than the close condition, and there were more low-construal-level descriptions 
chosen in the close condition than the distant condition. 
Previous research compared construal levels between thinking about different 
psychological distances, but did not compare construal level between thinking about the 
future and past.  For example, Semin and Smith (1999) in their study 1 found participants 
used more abstract languages to describe distant past events than recent past event, and in 
their study 2 found abstract language led participants to think about more distant past than 
specific language. In their study 1, researchers asked participants to think about events 
happened in recent (i.e. a week ago) and distant past (i.e. at least one year ago), and then 




in more abstract language than recent events, and recent events were described in more 
specific language than distant events. In their study 2, depending on different trials, 
researchers gave participants abstract or specific retrieval cues to prime different levels of 
abstractness, and analyzed the dates of events that participants answered. Participants in the 
abstract trial needed to describe their personality traits; and in the specific trial participants 
needed to describe an event that reflects this personality trait. For example, participants in the 
specific trial answered question “Think about an occasion when you helped somebody”, and 
described this event. Participants in the abstract trial answered question “How helpful a 
person are you”, and describe an event that showed their helpfulness. Finally, participants 
needed to indicate when the event that they described had occurred by writing down a date. 
Results showed that participants who were primed by abstract language described events that 
were more distant than participants who were primed by specific language.  
These studies on CLT for close / distant distance treated the past and future as if they 
are symmetrical. However, other research suggests there are temporal asymmetry between 
past and future. For example, Caruso, Van Boven, Chin, and Ward (2013) found that 
participants thought future events were psychologically closer than the same events in the 
past. In their study 2, participants in the future condition participated in the study a week 
before Valentine’s Day, and they described what they planned to do on Valentine’s Day. 
Participants in the past condition participated a week after Valentine’s Day, and they 
described what they had done on Valentine’s Day. All participants then evaluated the 
psychological distance they felt for Valentine’s Day on a seven-point scale (from very short 
time to very long time). Participants in future condition evaluated the Valentine’s Day closer 
than participant in past condition, even though the dates were in fact the same temporal 
distance away. Rinaldi, Locati, Parolin, and Girelli (2017) found similar results in people 




to think about one month from today in the future and to think about one month ago in the 
past. All participants then needed to evaluate how psychologically close they felt about one 
month ahead in future, and one month ago in past. Specifically, participants needed to 
indicate on a 10-point scale, from 1 (“really close to now”) to 10 (“really far from now”). 
Results showed that, participants in the control and anxiety groups thought that thinking 
about future was psychologically closer to past, but participants in the depression group did 
not show this pattern. 
Although previous CLT studies had explored the temporal distance effect on construal 
levels in the future and past respectively, there is no study making direct comparison between 
past and future construal levels. As I mentioned above, there might be temporal asymmetry in 
psychological distance, therefore it is important to explore whether thinking about past and 
future would lead to different construal levels. Furthermore, some CLT researchers suggested 
that high and low interpretation level serve different functions. For example, Trope and 
Liberman (2010) suggested that high and low levels of construal serve different cognitive 
functions. The reason why people use high construal levels to represent distant events is that 
people need to preserve the fundamental and stable properties of events to help long-term 
prospection and retrospection. In contrast, low construal levels that preserve many applied 
details and information are helpful for immediate action and specific performance regulation. 
Furthermore, some researchers explored the functions of speculative thinking of the 
past and future from the counterfactual thinking instead of construal level perspective, which 
provides a comprehensive view to understand the functions of speculative thinking of the past 
and future. For example, Smallman and McCulloch (2012) explored speculative thinking 
about the past and future events in different psychological distances. In two experiments, 
researchers explored the link between psychological distance and counterfactual thinking’s 




manipulating past psychological distance can change how counterfactual thinking facilitates 
behavioral intentions. Specifically, participants saw negative events (e.g., getting sunburn) on 
screen. Participants then imagined the negative events either happened in last year (i.e. distant 
past) or on yesterday (i.e. close past). After that, participants were either primed by 
counterfactual thinking information (e.g., “Could have worn sunscreen”). Finally, participants 
evaluated whether they will change their behaviors (e.g., “Now I will use sunscreen”) by 
indicating “yes” or “no”. Results showed that imagining distant past events lead participants 
to have longer reaction time to indicate they will change behaviors than imagining close past 
events. Researchers suggested that the function of counterfactual thinking (which produces 
relevant behavioral intention) is affected by different temporal distances.  
In Smallman and McCulloch (2012)’s experiment 2, researchers studied whether 
manipulating future psychological distance can change the likelihood of counterfactual 
thinking to form behavioral intentions. Participants also looked at some negative events on 
the screen (e.g., getting sunburn), and then received a counterfactual or factual prime that is 
similar to the previous experiment. In the near future trial, participants see action intention 
related to negative events happened in the near future (e.g. ‘If this happens next week, I will 
wear sunscreen’). In the far future trial, participants see action intentions related to negative 
events that happened in the far future (e.g. ‘If this happens next year, I will wear sunscreen’). 
The researchers found that participants responded more quickly to action intentions in the 
near future. In summary, researchers suggested that thinking counterfactually (i.e. speculative 
thinking about the past) about close psychological distance is more likely to generate an 
action-changing plan than thinking counterfactually about far psychological distance. 
Above two experiments showed that the preparatory function of counterfactual 
thinking (i.e. generating future behavioral plans) is sensitive to changes in the temporal 




past or in the future. Also, compared to the behavioral intentions in the distant future, 
counterfactual thinking can better facilitate behavioral intentions in the near future. As 
speculative thinking about the past, the function of counterfactual thinking is affected by 
different temporal distances, which indicates that the function of general speculative thinking 
may be affected by temporal distance. So in this chapter, I plan to further explore whether 
temporal distance has different effects on speculative thinking of the past and future. 
Specifically, this chapter will study whether temporal distance will show that speculative 
thinking of the past and future have different construal levels. Furthermore, I will further 
discuss different functions that speculative thinking with different psychological 
distances/interpretation levels serve. 
Overall, I suggest that exploring the temporal asymmetry in construal levels can help 
to understand the functional difference between thinking about the future and past from 
construal level perspective. Therefore, this chapter aims to explore the function of speculative 
thinking from the perspective of psychological distance/construal level, studying the temporal 
asymmetry in the function of speculative thinking. In this chapter, I adapted the open 
description and personal agency questionnaires from Liberman and Trope’ study (1998, study 
1). My experiment 5 had a 2 (past / future) by 2 (close / distant) design, making direct 




80 psychology students (63 women, 17 men; 15.2% Asian, 6.3% African or 
Caribbean, 72.6% Caucasian, 6.3% described ethnicity in another way or did not say) from 
the University of Birmingham participated to gain course credits. I used sample sizes (around 




1998) to detect similar effect sizes. Participants in this study were predominantly female 
(78.8 %) and White British (56.3 %), reflecting the student cohort from which they were 
recruited. In the original study, participants completed the questionnaires in groups of 2-8 
participants. In this study, participants completed the questionnaire individually. 
3.3.2. Design 
I used a 2 (Past / Future) by 2 (Close / Distant) between-subjects design. Participants 
were alternately assigned to one of four experimental conditions. 
3.3.3. Materials 
The open-ended questionnaire in this study was adapted from Liberman and Trope’s 
study 1 (1998). The original questionnaire asked participants to imagine and describe seven 
activities (e.g. reading a science fiction book) either happened tomorrow or in next year. In 
my experiment, I added “Past - Close” and “Past - Distant” versions of questionnaires that 
asked the participants to imagine and describe the activities either happened yesterday or in 
last year. 
The second part of this study used an adapted personal agency level questionnaire 
from Vallacher and Wegner’s study (1989), as also used by Liberman and Trope’s study 1 
(1998). This questionnaire is a forced-choice questionnaire. Each item on the questionnaire 
represents one activity, followed by two statements which are one low-level statement and 
one high-level statement respectively (e.g. For the activity “making a list”, the low-level 
statement might be “writing things down”, while the high-level statement might be “Getting 
organized”). Participants chose the one that best described the activity. The original 
questionnaire included 25 activities. In this study, I used the modified version of Liberman 
and Trope’s study (1998), where they deleted 6 items that they thought were unsuitable for 





As in the Liberman and Trope’s study 1 (1998) that used the open-ended and forced-
choice questionnaires, my participants in all conditions also completed both questionnaires.  
Depending on different conditions, the open-ended questionnaire and adapted 
personal agency level questionnaire had different time indicators with different temporal 
distances (i.e. yesterday, last year, tomorrow, and next year). Participants in the Future - Close 
condition read the instruction that “Your task is to imagine that you will do seven activities 
tomorrow, and to describe these activities”. Then participants wrote descriptions for 7 
imaginary tomorrow activities including “reading a science fiction book”, “moving into a 
new apartment”, “spending a weekend with your family”, “taking an exam”, “having a 
party”, “writing a letter to your family”, and “watching TV”. After completing the open-
ended questionnaire, participants went on to complete the forced-choice questionnaire. 
Participants read the instruction that “You will find several different behaviours listed. After 
each behaviour will be two choices of different ways in which the behaviour might be 
identified. Here is an example: 
Attending class 
_a. sitting in a chair 
_b. looking at the board 
Your task is to choose the identification, a or b, that best describes the behaviour for 
you.” Then participants made decisions for 19 imaginary tomorrow activities such as 
“making a list tomorrow”, “reading tomorrow”, and “washing clothes tomorrow”. 
The experiment procedures of the other three conditions (i.e. Future - Distant 




Close condition. The only difference was that participants in the other three conditions were 
asked to imagine activities happening in different times. For example, participants in the 
Future - Distant condition read the instruction that “Your task is to imagine that you will do 
seven activities next year”, and wrote descriptions for the same 7 activities happening in next 
year. Then participants went on to complete the forced-choice questionnaire, making 
decisions for same 19 imaginary activities happening in next year. Similarly, participants in 
the Past - Close condition and Past - Distant condition completed questionnaires imagining 
activities yesterday and last year. 
3.4. Results  
3.4.1. Open-Ended Questionnaire 
Consistent with the original study (Liberman & Trope, 1998), there were two 
independent coders coding the open-ended descriptions. The coding strategy was that 
descriptions with high construal level have the structure “[description] by [activity]”, while 
descriptions with low construal level have the structure “[activity] by [description]”. For 
example, for the activity “washing clothes”, a high-level description “removing odours from 
clothes” fits the high-construal-level structure (i.e., “I remove odours from clothes by 
washing clothes”) better than the low-construal-level structure. On the other hand, the 
description “going to the park together” fits the low-construal-level structure better (i.e., “I 
wash clothes by putting clothes into the machine”) than the high-construal-level structure.  
This coding strategy was same as the original study. 
Our two coders classified the open descriptions into three types, which were “high 
level” descriptions, “low level” descriptions, and “both or neither high /  low level” 
descriptions. There was a total of 560 open descriptions that participants gave (i.e. 80 
participants times 7 questions). There were 331 out of 560 descriptions that two coders gave 




that one coder classified them as one of the two descriptions, and the another coder classified 
them as the “both or neither high / low level” descriptions. As in the original study, in this 
case it was coded as the specific one that chose a specific high or low level of classification. 
Also, there were 9 descriptions (1.6 %) that one coder classified them as one of the two 
descriptions (i.e. high or low level descriptions), and another coder classified them as the 
other kind of description. Following the original study, a third coder (who was blind to the 
conditions from which these descriptions came) resolved the dispute.  
As in the original study, I scored the high-level descriptions as 1, neither high-level 
nor low-level description and both high-level and low-level descriptions were scored as 0, 
and low-level descriptions were scored -1. I summed over the total score of seven description 
questions for each participants. I ran a repeated measures ANOVA with two between 
participant factors (time: past or future; distance: close or far) on the total score of the open 
descriptions. As predicted, there was a main effect for distance: scores for distant activities 
(M = .78) were higher than scores for close activities (M = -3.25), F (1, 76) = 23.01, p <.001, 
partial μ²=.23. There was also a main effect of time: scores for past activities (M = -.38) were 
higher than scores for future activities (M = -2.05), F (1, 76) = 4.30, p = .041, partial μ²=.05. 
For example, in the distant conditions (i.e. Future - Distant and Past-Distant conditions) and 
the past conditions (i.e. Past-Close and Past Distant conditions), “spending a weekend with 
family” might be described as “improving relationship”; while in the close conditions and the 
future conditions, the same activity might be described as “going to the park”. There was no 





Table 5. Condition means (averaged over participants) and standard errors of those 
means in the open ended questionnaire  
 
Participants’ Descriptions 
Means  Standard Errors 
Conditions Future-Close -3.8 .75 
 Future-Distant -.38 .99 
 Past-Close -2.75 .91 
 Past-Distant 2.05 .70 
 
3.4.2. Forced-Choice Questionnaire 
For the forced-choice responses, consistent with the original study, I scored the high-
construal-level option as 1 and the low-construal-level option as 0. I then summed these 
scores to give a total of high construal choices for each participant, from 0 to 19. I ran a 
repeated measures ANOVA with two between participant factors (past / future; close / distant) 
on these scores. There was no main effect of distance (distant activities M = 11.88, close 
activities M = 10.80), F (1, 76) = 1.83, p = .180, partial μ² =.02, which was inconsistent with 
the original study. Also, there was no main effect of time, F (1, 76) = 3.31, p =.073, partial 
μ²=.04; and there was no interaction effect between the factors, F (1, 76) = 1.84, p =.179, 





Table 6. Mean scores in the forced-choice questionnaire 
 
Participants’ Forced-Choice  
Means Standard Errors 
Conditions Future-Close 12.05 .94 
 Future-Distant 11.90 .67 
 Past-Close 9.55 .84 
 Past-Distant 11.85 .67 
 
3.5. Discussions of Experiment 5 
For the open - description questionnaire, participants in the Close conditions elicited 
more low-level descriptions than participants in the Distant conditions. Also, participants in 
the Future conditions elicited more low-level descriptions than participants in the Past 
conditions. These results suggested that thinking about far psychological distance can lead to 
higher construal level than thinking about close psychological distance, and thinking about 
the past can lead to higher construal level than thinking about the future. My study replicated 
the open-description results of original study (Liberman & Trope, 1998 study 1), and made 
direct comparison between past and future construal level. These results suggest that 
construal level is not only influenced by temporal distance but also the direction of time (i.e. 
past / future).  
To consider the power of Experiment 5 to detect the effects of interest, I compared the 
sample size of Experiment 5 with the sample size of previous research. In Experiment 5 (N = 
80 with two conditions), I adapted Liberman and Trope’s experiment (1998) in which they 




the sample size of previous experiment. It would give me more power to identify a significant 
effect. 
As for the forced-choice questionnaire, participants in the Close conditions did not 
elicit more low-level descriptions than participants in the Distant conditions, and participants 
in the Future conditions did not elicit more low-level descriptions than participants in the Past 
conditions. These results were inconsistent with the results of the original study. I suggested 
that this may be because participants were less attentive when answering the forced-choice 
questionnaire than open description questionnaire. First, I cannot identify whether any of the 
participants just randomly chose answers for the forced-choice questions by looking at the 
options that they chose, and the participants may be less attentive because of knowing this. 
On the other hand, (compared to answering the forced choice questionnaire), when answering 
the open description questionnaire, participants needed to put more effort into describing an 
event. Second, the forced-choice questionnaire was always the second questionnaire that 
participants answered, which was the same in the previous study (Liberman & Trope, 1998). 
Participants may be more tired and less focused on answering the second questionnaire than 
the first questionnaire. 
My work on CLT links into discussion about function of thinking about the past and 
future. CLT (e.g. Trope & Liberman, 2010) suggested that close psychological distance can 
lead to lower construal levels than far psychological distance. Based on this, my results 
indicate that thinking about future may lead to closer psychological distance than thinking 
about past. Difference in psychological distance fits with the idea that people think differently 
about the past and future. Caruso et al., (2013) suggested that the temporal asymmetry effect 
that seeing future events as closer in time than past events may be because people emphasize 
future events than past events, which is consistent with the suggestion that people more value 




This future orientation is functional for changing future behaviors because future events are 
open to change but past events cannot be changed (I will return to this point in the general 
discussion). 
Moreover, some research on temporal asymmetry found that people have different 
feelings about thinking about the future and past. For instance, five studies by Van Boven and 
Ashworth (2007) showed that people reported stronger emotions when thinking about events 
in the future than past. For example, in study 1, participants imagined the enjoyment of the 
Thanksgiving holiday in the past or future, and evaluated their emotional intensity about their 
Thanksgiving holidays. Researchers found that participants reported more intense emotions 
for future than thinking about the past. In addition, Van Boven, Kane, McGraw, and Dale 
(2010) found that events generating more intense emotion have a closer psychological 
distance than events generating less intense emotion. In their study 2, participants imagined 
visiting a dentist in past or future and described this event either emotionally or neutrally. 
Participants then rated how close they felt about this event from “very close” to “very 
distant”. Participants in the emotional group rated a closer psychological distance than 
participants in the neutral group. This evidence (e.g. Van Boven and Ashworth, 2007; Van 
Boven et al., 2010) not only reflects the temporal asymmetry in thinking about the future and 
past, but also consistent with my findings that the future is thought of as closer than the past. 
However, currently we do not know whether more intense emotion leads to closeness, or 
closeness leads to more intense emotion. 
Experiment 5 found that thinking about the past leads to higher construal level than 
thinking about the future, which suggested that thinking about the past might lead to further 
psychological distance than the future according to the CLT perspective. These results 
paralleled the finding that thinking about the same event in past or future can generate 




that, people value future events more than past events. In their study 1, participants either 
imagined they will do a teaching assistant job in the next month, or imagined they had done a 
teaching assistant job in the past month. All participants evaluated how much payment they 
should receive. The payments evaluated by participants in the future condition were higher 
than the payments evaluated by participants in the past condition. Therefore, I suggest that 
there may be two possible mechanisms in the temporal asymmetry in thinking about the 
future and past. One is that thinking about past/future leads directly to different emotional 
intensity, the other may be thinking about the past and future lead to different psychological 
distance which then leads to different emotional intensity.  
3.5.1. The Functional Asymmetry between Thinking about the Past and Future 
I suggest that thinking about the future is more likely to serve preparatory function for 
future events than thinking about the past, because thinking about the future has lower 
construal level than thinking about the past. CLT suggests that psychologically close events 
are more likely to lead to specific action plans than psychologically distant events (e.g. Trope 
& Liberman, 2010).  Trope and Liberman (2010) suggested that high construal level 
corresponds those stable and central features, and low construal level corresponds those 
unstable and surface features. Therefore, the function of high construal level is to maintain 
those stable features of events. Specifically, as the psychological distance increases, the high 
construal level characteristics (i.e. central features that are not easy to change with time) will 
become more and more prominent; as the psychological distance decreases, the low construal 
level characteristics (i.e. surface features that are easy to change with time) will become more 
and more prominent. Also, Kivetz and Tyler (2007) suggested that low construal level reflects 
a realistic state that is easy to change, while high construal level reflects an idealistic state 
that is not easy to change.  




to learn from the past. This may be because those features that are stable and not easy to 
change over time can be easily grasped by people and become people’s experiences, and thus 
can be applied to future practice. On the other hand, those features that are unstable and easy 
to change over time would be not easy to apply to the practice of improving the future, 
because they change frequently. This may be the reason why thinking about the past has a 
higher construal level than thinking about the future. On the other hand, low construal level 
contains specific information about how actions to be performed, which is helpful for 
completing upcoming tasks. Therefore, I suggest that the low construal level / close 
psychological distance than high construal level / far psychological distance may serve more 
preparatory function for improving future performance. I suggest that this is because the low 
construal level contains more details, which is helpful for future performance (Trope & 
Liberman, 2010).  
In addition, the above suggestion that thinking about the future is more functional 
than thinking about the past is line with some studies that demonstrates differences between 
counterfactual and prefactual thinking. For example, Ferrante et al. (2013) found that 
prefactual thinking focuses on more controllable features of event than counterfactual 
thinking. Compared to uncontrollable features, controllable features allow people to change 
them, thus they are realistic constraints of event. Therefore this finding suggests prefactual 
thinking (compared to counterfactual thinking) is helpful for regulating behaviours and 
improving future performance. This is consistent with my chapter 4 demonstrating that 
prefactual thinking may serve more preparatory function than counterfactual thinking (n.b. I 
return to this in chapter 4). 
3.5.2. Conclusion 
Experiment 5 explored the temporal distance effect on construal level in past and 




events with far than close psychological distance leads to higher construal level, and thinking 
about future than past events leads to higher construal level. I discussed that thinking about 
the future may have closer psychological distance than thinking about the past, and low 
construal level / close psychological distance may be more functional for improving future 
performance than high construal level / far psychological distance. Combining these findings, 
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People can speculate about past and future events that they believe have or will 
happen and those that they think did not or will not happen. Previous studies suggested that 
thinking about future events focuses on more controllable features than past events, serving 
more preparatory function. However, these studies did not consider whether the speculative 
thinking was about real or hypothetical events. I explored whether Realistic Prefactual 
Thinking focuses more on controllable features than Hypothetical Prefactual Thinking, and 
whether Hypothetical Prefactual Thinking focuses on more controllable features than 
Counterfactual Thinking. Experiment 6 (N=45) demonstrated that participants doing Realistic 
Prefactual Thinking elicited more controllable modifications than participants doing 
Hypothetical Prefactual Thinking. Experiment 7 (N=51) indicated that participants doing 
Hypothetical Prefactual Thinking focused on more controllable modifications than 
participants doing Counterfactual Thinking. Experiment 8 (N=35) explored whether 
Hypothetical Prefactual Thinking about psychological closeness rather than distance can lead 
participants to have more controllable modifications; however, results did not support this 
hypothesis. I concluded that both temporal and reality dimensions may impact on people’s 
speculative thoughts, resulting in significant differences in controllable modifications.  
4.2. Introduction 
In our daily life, we often think how things would have been different in the past, and 
how things would or will be different in the future. Imagining how things would or will differ 
in the future is called Prefactual Thinking (e.g. Epstude, Scholl, & Roese, 2016; Schacter, 
Addis, & Buckner, 2007), and imagining how things would have been different in the past is 
called Counterfactual Thinking (e.g. Beck, & Riggs, 2014; Roese, 1997; Roese & Olson, 
1993; Byrne, 2002). Both counterfactual and prefactual thinking are two types of speculative 




explore the function of speculative thinking.  
One function of speculative thinking seems likely to be helping people to perform 
better in future similar events. In this case, the content of speculative thoughts need to be 
things that the individual can control. For example, if a student fails an exam and speculates 
about how things might go better at the resit, she is more likely to improve her future 
behavior if she thinks “I should start my revision earlier” rather than “The questions should 
be easier”.  
The functional theory of counterfactual thinking proposed by Epstude and Roese 
(2008) focused specifically on how counterfactual thinking about what might have been can 
influence future behavior. The main idea of this theory is that by imagining a better past one 
prepares for similar future events with the goal of achieving a better future outcome. 
Researchers suggested that people learn from their past failures when they expect to 
encounter similar situations again in the future. Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, & McMullen 
(1993) showed that people were more likely to generate upward counterfactuals, which 
suggested ways in which the outcome of an event could have been better, when they 
anticipated that a similar event would be encountered in the future than when they thought it 
would not be repeated.   
Not all speculative thoughts focus on past events, however. We can also speculate 
directly about the future, entertaining what might happen. Common sense suggests that these 
thoughts are likely to be involved in preparing our future behavior. One possibility then is 
that speculative thoughts about the past and future share a common purpose: to inform future 
behavior. But some evidence suggests that there may be important differences in the way 
people think about past and future events that call this into question.  
Evidence that leads us to doubt that counterfactual thoughts are functional for 




The researchers asked participants to do a multiplication task, and then to think 
counterfactually about how their performance could have been better in the task. Participants 
were likely to imagine changing uncontrollable aspects of the situation (e.g., “things could 
have been better if I had more time to solve the task”) rather than controllable aspects such as 
their choices (e.g., “things could have been better if I had chosen the other envelope”). In 
other words, the content of the majority of thoughts that they had could not have directly led 
to different future behavior (n.b. I return to the content neutral pathway proposed in the 
functional theory in the General Discussion). 
Subsequently, Ferrante, Girotto, Stragà, and Walsh (2013) suggested that when people 
speculate about future events they are more likely to think about controllable aspects of the 
event than when they think counterfactually. These findings are important and challenging for 
the functional theory. For example, Ferrante et al. (2013, study 1) asked participants to 
attempt a scrambled word task and then think counterfactually about their performance or 
prefactually about a future attempt. The researchers found that participants who answered the 
counterfactual thinking question (i.e. “things would have been better for me if…”) were more 
likely to focus on the uncontrollable features of the task (e.g., “…if I had longer time”) than 
participants who answered the prefactual thinking question (i.e. “things will be better for me 
in the next game if…”). Participants who did prefactual thinking were more likely to focus on 
the controllable features (e.g., “…if I used another strategy”) than participants who answered 
the counterfactual thinking question. The researchers suggested that prefactual thinking 
focuses on more controllable premises than counterfactual thinking, and thus prefactual 
thinking is more likely to serve a preparatory function for the future than counterfactual 
thinking. In sum, this study indicates that types of speculative thinking may differ in how 
well they prepare us for the future.  




Girotto (2017) with a similar design as Ferreante et al. (2013). In their study 1a, after the 
word search task, participants answered the counterfactual thinking question (e.g. “things 
would have been better for me if…”) or the prefactual thinking question (e.g. “things will be 
better for me in the next game if…”). They also found that participants answering 
counterfactual thinking questions generated more uncontrollable modifications than 
participants answering prefactual thinking question, while participants answering prefactual 
thinking question generated more controllable modifications than participants answering 
counterfactual thinking questions.  
These findings have been interpreted as showing that speculative thinking about the 
future is more functional than corresponding speculative thinking about the past. However, 
there is another dimension on which speculative thoughts can differ: whether they are about 
real or hypothetical events. In the Ferrante et al. (2013) study 1, participants in the prefactual 
condition were told that they would do another similar scrambled-word task in few minutes. I 
label this Realistic Prefactual Thinking as the event about which they were speculating was 
expected to happen. However, in the counterfactual condition, participants were speculating 
about an event that they knew did not happen. Indeed, the knowledge that a counterfactual 
event did not happen, even though it could have, is often thought of as a defining feature of 
counterfactual thinking. Thus, counterfactual thinking, is necessarily Hypothetical 
Counterfactual (past) Thinking. It is possible that the difference Ferrante and colleagues 
found between prefactual and counterfactual thinking actually reflects differences in whether 
the individual is thinking about real or hypothetical events, rather than past or future events. 
By testing this possibility experimentally, I aim to provide a more comprehensive picture of 
speculative thinking.  
To do this, I also introduced a third type of speculative thinking: Hypothetical 




happen, but is not expected. Although some studies (e.g. Ferrante et al., 2013; Mercier et al., 
2017) take prefactual thinking to be about an anticipated future reality, others construe 
prefactual thinking as more hypothetical. Epstude, Scholl, and Roese (2016) suggested that 
prefactual thoughts have the form “If action X is taken, it will lead to outcome Y”, defining 
prefactual thinking as thinking about how things will be different to current reality, without a 
firm commitment to a specific future event.  
In order to understand when people generate controllable thoughts that could be 
functional in improving future behavior, I consider this dimension of speculative thinking: 
whether the event one is speculating about is taken to be real (something that will happen in 
the future, Realistic Prefactual Thinking) or hypothetical (something that is not expected to 
happen in the future, Hypothetical Prefactual Thinking, or, something that did not happen in 
the past, Counterfactual Thinking). Note that there seems to be a fourth type of speculative 
thinking, Realistic Counterfactual Thinking, but this is not the same type of speculation: if 
one thinks about the events that really happened in the past it is an act of remembering, rather 
than speculation about a possible event. Memory may indeed be a constructive process, but 
for the purposes of this chapter I do not consider it a type of speculative thinking about how 
things might be (or have been). 
The real/hypothetical dimension is known to be psychologically important. Some 
researchers have expressed concern about the tasks used in many decision making studies 
being hypothetical, as decisions about real events might differ from decisions about 
hypothetical events (e.g. Camerer and Mobbs, 2017; Galotti, 1989; Galotti, Ciner, 
Altenbaumer, Geerts, Rupp, & Woulfe, 2006). Empirical evidence seems to justify this 
concern. For example, Bostyn, Sevenhant, & Roets (2018) asked one group of participants to 
imagine that a cage of five mice will receive an electric shock in 20 seconds, but the 




mouse. Participants in the other group were given the same dilemma, but were led to believe 
that their decision was about real mice that they could see in front of them (even though in 
fact the mice were not shocked). Participants in the real group were less likely to decide to 
pull the lever than those in the hypothetical group. Robinson, Pendle, Rowley, Beck, and 
McColgan (2009) also found differences between real and hypothetical versions of game that 
involved making decisions about chance events. Specifically, researchers divided participants 
into a real die-throwing group and a hypothetical die-throwing group. Participants chose 
whether to guess the number rolled before it was thrown or after it was thrown. There were 
different preferences for when the two groups preferred to guess what number would be 
thrown: Participants in the real group were more likely to prefer to guess after die-rolling, but 
participants in the hypothetical group showed the opposite preference. 
To sum up, although researchers have sought to explain the function of speculative 
thinking, they have focused on differences between past and future in the content of 
speculative thoughts. Research has neglected whether participants are thinking about events 
they believe will happen (real) or those they believe will not or did not happen (hypothetical). 
In three experiments, I attempted to provide a more comprehensive picture of how different 
types of speculative thinking might influence future behaviors. Experiment 6 explored the 
effect of reality / hypothetical thinking dimension on controllable modifications, and 
Experiment 7 explored the effect of past / future thinking dimension on controllable 
modifications. If my hypothesis that the reality-hypothetical dimension influences the number 
of controllable thoughts was (exclusively) true, participants doing Realistic Prefactual 
Thinking would focus on more controllable features of the task than participants doing 
Hypothetical Prefactual Thinking and there should be no difference between participants 
doing Hypothetical Prefactual Thinking and Counterfactual Thinking. If Ferrante’s 




conditions in Experiment 6, but a difference in Experiment 7. A third possibility was that both 
dimensions may impact on people’s speculative thoughts, resulting in significant differences 
in both studies. In Experiment 8, I further tested whether the past-future effect might be 
explained by a different dimension, psychological distance, based on the temporal asymmetry 
literature I discussed in last chapter (e.g. Caruso et al., 2013). 
4.3. Experiment 6 
Experiment 6 adapted Ferrante et al.’s study 1 (2013) to explore the hypotheticality 
dimension. I used two prefactual thinking conditions. Participants in the Realistic Prefactual 
condition were told they would do the activity in few minutes, and participants in the 
Hypothetical Prefactual condition were told just to imagine they would do the task. Based on 
Ferrante et al.’s findings that Realistic Prefactual Thinking leads to more controllable 
modifications than Hypothetical Counterfactual Thinking, my hypothesis was that 
participants doing Realistic Prefactual Thinking would have more controllable modifications 
than participants doing Hypothetical Prefactual Thinking.  
4.3.1. Method 
4.3.1.1. Participants 
55 psychology students (46 women, 9 men) of the University of Birmingham 
participated to gain course credits. No individual participated in more than one experiment 
reported in this chapter. 
4.3.1.2. Design & Materials 
Participants were alternately assigned to one of two conditions: Realistic Prefactual 
and Hypothetical Prefactual conditions. 
The scrambled-word task used in the original paper (Ferrante et al., 2013) was in 




was to find a 6-letter English word in each of 12 grids. This word must be readable by 
moving from one letter to another. Participants should write the word down in the space 
provided next to the grid once they found it.  Participants should only look for a 6 letter word 
(there may also be 2, 3, 4 or 5 letter words). The first letter of the word can be any of the 8 
letters present in the grid, and the letters can be linked either vertically, horizontally, and 
diagonally. For example in Figure 1, the answer is PUZZLE. There was not necessarily only 
one answer to every puzzle. Participants had 2 minutes and 15 seconds to complete this task.  
Figure 1. One example of scrambled-word question and solution 
P L Z P 
E O Z U 
 
 
See the Appendices F, G, and H for materials used in Experiment 6, 7, and 8. 
4.3.1.3. Procedure 
As in Ferrante et al (2013)’s study 1, participants in both conditions were presented 
with 12 scrambled-word questions. No participant solved all scrambled-word questions. After 
completing the task, participants in both conditions scored their performance on a 7-point 
scale from -3 (poor performance) to 3 (perfect performance). Next, participants answered 
either Realistic Prefactual Thinking or Hypothetical Prefactual Thinking questions. 
Participants in the Realistic Prefactual condition read the instruction, “You have just 
played the “Scrambled-word game”. In a few moments you will play the game with new 
words again”. Then these participants answered a Realistic Prefactual Thinking question, 
“things will be better for me in the next game if ... Write at least one way in which you would 




complete a new set of scrambled-word puzzles. 
On the other hand, participants in the Hypothetical condition read the instruction that 
“You have just played the ‘Scrambled-word game’. The game is over, and there will be no 
more scrambled-word puzzles in this study. However, please imagine that in a few moments 
you will play the game with new words again.” Then these participants answered a 
Hypothetical Prefactual question, “things would be better for me in the next game if ... Write 
at least one way in which you would complete this sentence”. Participants in the Hypothetical 
condition did not do further scrambled-word puzzles after answering the question. 
4.3.2. Results & Discussions 
In order to minimise the impact of English proficiency on task performance and 
thinking modification questions, my data analysis excluded non-native English speakers’ 
data. Nine participants’ data were excluded from the analysis, leaving 46 native English 
speakers’ data.  
There was no difference in the rates of correct solutions to the scrambled word game 
between participants in two conditions (Realistic Prefactual M = .64; Hypothetical Prefactual 
M = .71), t (44) = .24, p = .809, d = .07. I compared the self-evaluation performance rating 
participants gave on the 7-point scale, finding there were similar negative self-evaluations in 
two conditions (Realistic Prefactual M = -2.68; Hypothetical Prefactual M = -2.50), t (44) 
= .94, p = .351, d = .28.  
Participants’ answers about changing focus and attention (e.g., “If I was more focused 
on the task”), and answers about changing strategies used to answer the puzzles (e.g., “If I did 
not waste too much time on one puzzle”) were coded as controllable modifications. 
Responses that involved changing task features (e.g., “If I had more time”, “If the letters 
didn’t have to join right next to each other”), participants’ psychological and physical status 




game (e.g., “If I knew more 6 letters words”), participants’ stable personal traits and 
characteristics (e.g., “If I was smarter”), and the situation (e.g., “If I could have done it in a 
group”) were coded as uncontrollable modifications. The few remaining responses were 
coded as ambiguous modifications. 
In Experiment 6, two independent coders, who were both unaware of the hypothesis, 
coded the total 93 responses for 46 English-speaker participants. Their agreement rate was 
96% in Experiment 1, Cohen’s kappa = .88, p < .001. Disagreements were resolved in two 
ways. If one modification was coded as an ambiguous modification by one coder and was 
coded as controllable modification or uncontrollable modification by the other coder, then I 
followed the latter coding. If one modification was coded as controllable modification by one 
coder and was coded as uncontrollable modification by the other coder, then the disagreement 
was solved by the third coder who was blind to the conditions. In total, there were 40 
modifications coded as controllable modification, 52 modifications coded as uncontrollable 
modification, and 1 modification coded as ambiguous modification. 
Participants in the Realistic Prefactual condition (n = 22) produced 1.86 modifications 
and participants in the Hypothetical Prefactual condition (n = 24) produced 2.17 
modifications (See Table 7). There was no difference in the number of modifications 
produced, t (44) = 1.17, p = .249, d = .35. There was 1 modification that both coders coded as 
an ambiguous modification, thus the subsequent data analysis for the modifications did not 
include this modification. In addition, one participant did not provide any modifications, so 
the number of modifications for this participant was considered as 0. I included this 
participant in the above comparisons of correct solutions and self-evaluation performance, 
but I excluded them from the following analysis comparing controllable modifications, 
leaving 45 native English speakers.  




number of controllable modifications for each condition. The Reality condition elicited more 
controllable modifications than the Hypothetical condition, Mann–Whitney U = 170.50, p 
=.048, r = .30. I then compared the first modifications that participants gave in the two 
conditions (See Table 8). For the first modifications, participants in the Reality condition 
elicited more controllable modifications than participants in the Hypothetical condition, 
although this did not reach significance when I made the continuity correction for a 2x2 Chi 
Square test, χ2 (1, N = 44) = 3.06, p =.080, Cramer’s V = .31.  
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Experiment 6 Hypothetical Prefactual 
(n = 24) 
7 17 
 Realistic Prefactual (n = 
22) 
12 8 
Experiment 7 Hypothetical Prefactual 
(n = 23) 
12 11 
 Hypothetical 
Counterfactual (n = 28) 
4 23 
Experiment 8 Far Hypothetical 
Prefactual (n = 19) 
7 12 
Close Hypothetical 
Prefactual (n = 16) 
6 10 
 
To sum up, in Experiment 6, participants did Realistic Prefactual Thinking or 
Hypothetical Prefactual Thinking about how they could do better in the next task. Results 
showed that participants doing Realistic Prefactual Thinking focused on more controllable 
features than participants doing Hypothetical Prefactual Thinking. Experiment 6 showed that 
there is a reality / hypothetical difference in speculative thinking. This result challenges the 
view that counterfactual thinking is functional for improving future performance (e.g. 
Epstude & Roese, 2008). This finding went beyond Ferrante et al.’s finding (2013, study 1) 




because Experiment 6 demonstrated the reality / hypothetical difference in prefactual 
thinking.  
4.4. Experiment 7 
Experiment 6 showed that there was a reality / hypothetical difference leading to 
difference in participants’ controllable modifications.  
As I mentioned in the introduction (section 4.2), the difference Ferrante and 
colleagues found between prefactual and counterfactual thinking could reflect either 
differences in whether the individual is thinking about real or hypothetical events, differences 
in whether the individual is thinking about past or future events, or both these differences. 
Therefore, my finding in Experiment 6 might be the cause of the difference in 
Ferrante et al.’s finding (2013, study 1), suggesting that there is no temporal asymmetry. The 
alternative is that there is a temporal asymmetry as well as the reality / hypothetical 
difference.  
To test this, I ran Experiment 7 exploring whether there is the temporal asymmetry in 
speculative thinking, leading participants to have different numbers of controllable 
modifications. Based on the original study (Ferrante et al., 2013) that found temporal 
asymmetry, I hypothesized that participants doing Hypothetical Prefactual Thinking would 




59 psychology students (58 women, 1 men) the University of Birmingham   




4.4.1.3. Design & Materials  
Participants were alternately assigned to one of two conditions: Hypothetical 
Counterfactual and Hypothetical Prefactual conditions. The scrambled-word tasks for both 
conditions were same as that in Experiment 6.  
4.4.1.4. Procedure 
As in Experiment 6, all participants attempted 12 scrambled-word questions, and 
evaluated their performance using a 7-point Likert scale (from -3 to 3). No participant solved 
all scrambled-word questions. 
Next, participants in both conditions considered their performance before answering 
Hypothetical Prefactual Thinking or Counterfactual Thinking questions. Participants in the 
Hypothetical Prefactual condition read that “You have just played the ‘Scrambled-word 
game’. The game is over, and there will be no more scrambled-word puzzles in this study. 
However, please imagine that in a few moments you will play the game with new words 
again.” Then participants answered the Hypothetical Prefactual Thinking question “things 
would be better for me in the next game if ... Write at least one way in which you would 
complete this sentence”. 
 Participants in the Hypothetical Counterfactual condition read that “You have just 
played the ‘Scrambled-word game’. The game is over, and there will be no more scrambled-
word puzzles in this study.” Then participants answered the Hypothetical Counterfactual 
Thinking question “things would have been better for me if ... Write at least one way in which 
you would complete this sentence”. 
4.4.2. Results & Discussions 
As in Experiment 6, I excluded non-native English speakers’ data. Eight participants’ 
data were excluded from the analysis, leaving 51 native English speakers’ data. Participants 




1.54; Hypothetical Prefactual M = 1.48), t (49) = .14, p = .893, d = .04, and similar negative 
self-evaluation ratings (Hypothetical Counterfactual M = -2.54; Hypothetical Prefactual M = -
2.35), t (49) = - .69, p = .495, d = .20. 
The coding strategy for modifications was same as Experiment 6. Two independent 
coders, unaware of the hypotheses, coded the 110 responses. Their agreement rate was 
97.7%, Cohen’s kappa = .94, p < .001. Disagreements were resolved in the same way as in 
Study 1. In total, there were 36 modifications coded as controllable modification, 71 
modifications coded as uncontrollable modification, and 3 modifications coded as ambiguous 
modification. Participants in the Hypothetical Counterfactual condition (n = 28) produced an 
average of 2.14 modifications and participants in the Hypothetical Prefactual condition (n = 
23) produced an average of 2.17 modifications (See Table 7), t (49) = -.16, p = .872, d = .05. 
I compared the total number of controllable modifications for each condition. 
Participants in Hypothetical Prefactual condition elicited more controllable modifications 
than Past condition, Mann–Whitney U = 176.50, p =.002, r = .43. I then considered only the 
first modifications for each condition (See Table 8). For the first modifications, a Chi Square 
test with continuity correction showed that participants in Hypothetical Prefactual condition 
elicited more controllable modifications than Hypothetical Counterfactual condition, χ2 (1, N 
= 51) = 6.34, p = .012, Cramer’s V = .40.   
In summary, participants in Experiment 7 did Hypothetical Prefactual Thinking or 
Hypothetical Counterfactual Thinking about their performance. Participants doing 
Hypothetical Prefactual Thinking focused on more controllable features than Hypothetical 
Counterfactual Thinking. Experiment 7 indicated that, thinking about the future (compared to 
thinking about the past) had more emphasis on controllable features even when we had 
controlled the reality / hypothetical difference, suggesting a temporal asymmetry effect. In 




thinking focuses on controllable features (e.g. Epstude and Roese, 2008). 
4.5. Experiment 8 
Experiment 7 showed that participants’ Hypothetical Prefactual Thinking was more 
likely to focus on controllable features than Hypothetical Counterfactual Thinking. Before 
accepting that this results from a straightforward difference between thoughts about the past 
and future I considered an alternative possibility, which is whether close / far distance could 
account for temporal asymmetry effect in controllable features. Some studies suggested that 
thinking about future events lead to closer psychological distance than past events, i.e. that 
the future events are construed as being closer to the person’s current experience. For 
example, Caruso, Van Boven, Chin, and Ward (2013) asked participants to consider and 
report a specific time (e.g. one year) and an event (e.g. Valentine’s Day) in the future or in the 
past. Participants reported that the future event felt closer in time than the past event. This 
result was interpreted as indicating that people are more future-oriented than past-oriented. 
Caruso et al., (2013) also suggested that this future orientation is functional for changing 
future behaviors because future events are open to change but past events cannot be changed. 
In Experiment 8, I hypothesized that, if the past / future difference found in Experiment 7 is 
really the result of the psychological distance difference between thinking about the future 
and past, Hypothetical Prefactual Thinking about event in far psychological distance would 
generate more controllable modifications than Hypothetical Prefactual Thinking about event 
in close psychological distance. Otherwise, Hypothetical Prefactual Thinking about event in 
far psychological distance would generate similar number of controllable modifications with 






44 psychology students (38 women, 6 men) of the University of Birmingham 
participated to gain course credits.  
4.5.1.2. Design & Materials 
Participants were alternately assigned to the Far Hypothetical Prefactual condition and 
the Close Hypothetical Prefactual condition respectively. The scrambled-word task used in 
this study was same as the one used in Experiment 6.  
4.5.1.3. Procedure 
As in Experiment 6, participants in both conditions completed the scrambled-word 
task and evaluated their performance. 
After completing the scrambled-word task, participants in the Close Hypothetical 
Prefactual condition read instruction that “You have just played the ‘Scrambled-word game’. 
The game is over, and there will be no more scrambled-word puzzles in this study. However, 
please imagine that in a few moments you will play the game with new words again.” Then 
they answered question “things would be better for me in the next game if ... Write at least 
one way in which you would complete this sentence”. 
Participants in the Far Hypothetical Prefactual condition read instruction that “You 
have just played the ‘Scrambled-word game’. The game is over, and there will be no more 
scrambled-word puzzles in this study. However, please imagine that in a year you will play 
the game with new words again.” Then they answered question “things would be better for 
me in the next game if ... Write at least one way in which you would complete this sentence”. 
4.5.2. Results & Discussions 




participants’ data were excluded from the analysis, leaving 35 native English speakers’ data. 
Participants in both two conditions had similar rates of correct solutions (Close Hypothetical 
Prefactual M = 1.44; Far Hypothetical Prefactual M = 1.26), t (33) = .34, p = .733, d = .12. 
Participants in two conditions had similar negative self-evaluation ratings (Close 
Hypothetical Prefactual M = -2.50; Far Hypothetical Prefactual M = -2.47), t (33) = - .08, p 
= .938, d = .03. 
The coding instruction for the modifications was same as that in Experiment 6. In 
Experiment 8, two independent coders, unaware of the hypotheses, coded the total 67 
responses. Their agreement rate was 89.8%, Cohen’s kappa = .79, p < .001. Disagreements 
were resolved by same way as that in Study 1 and 2.  In total, there were 24 modifications 
coded as controllable modification, 43 modifications coded as uncontrollable modification. 
Participants in the Close Hypothetical Prefactual condition (n = 16) generated an average of 
1.88 modifications and participants in the Far Hypothetical Prefactual condition (n = 19) 
generated an average of 1.95 (See Table 7), t (33) = -.27, p = .789, d = .09.  
I compared the total number of controllable modifications for each condition. 
Participants in Close Hypothetical Prefactual condition generated similar rates of controllable 
modifications with Future Hypothetical Prefactual condition, Mann–Whitney U = 143.00, p 
=.739, r = .06. As in Experiments 6 and 7, I then considered only the first modifications for 
each condition (See Table 8). For the first modifications, participants in Close Hypothetical 
Prefactual condition generated similar number of controllable modifications with the 
participants in Far Hypothetical Prefactual condition, χ2 (1, N = 35) < .01, p > .999, Cramer’s 
V <.01.  
To conclude, participants in Experiment 8 did Hypothetical Prefactual Thinking about 
their performance in close or far psychological distance. However, I did not find differences 




Prefactual conditions. Study 3 indicated that close / far distance did not account for temporal 
asymmetry effect in controllable features.  
4.6. Discussions of Experiments 6, 7, and 8 
To explore whether different types of speculative thinking vary in their potential to be 
functional, I studied the extent to which these different types generate controllable 
modifications. My goal was to explore Ferrante et al. (2013)’s claim that thoughts about 
future events have more controllable modifications than corresponding thoughts about past 
events; with my concern being that this reflected a difference in the hypothetically of the 
events rather than their temporal status. My three experiments suggested that there is not only 
a temporal dimension (i.e. past / future difference), but also a reality dimension (i.e. reality / 
hypothetical difference) in the function of speculative thinking. Experiment 6 indicated that 
Realistic Prefactual Thinking generated more controllable modifications than participants 
doing Hypothetical Prefactual Thinking. Experiment 7 demonstrated that Hypothetical 
Prefactual Thinking generated more controllable modifications than Hypothetical 
Counterfactual Thinking. Experiment 8 showed that Hypothetical Prefactual Thinking in 
close or far psychological distance resulted in similar numbers of controllable modifications. 
This final result showed that the temporal dimension has a real effect that is not caused by 
psychological distance. In the following discussion, I discuss a broad functional view of 
speculative thinking.  
I consider the power of my experiments to detect the effects of interest. One concern 
is that my sample sizes were smaller than those used by Ferrante et al. (2013), although two 
of my experiments produced significant results. In Experiment 6 (N = 45 with two 
conditions), I replicated Ferrante et al.’s finding (2013, study 1) in which they recruited 86 
participants for two conditions. Effect sizes for the key comparisons of interest in my first 




of the two dimensions in speculative thinking I demonstrated (i.e. the reality/hypothetical 
dimension, and the past/future dimension) are comparable. It is worth noting that the sample 
in Experiment 8 (N = 35 with two conditions) is slightly smaller than those in Experiment 6 
(N = 45 with two conditions) and Experiment 7 (N = 51 with two conditions). It would give 
me less power to identify a significant effect. It is possible that this resulted in the lack of a 
significant difference between the Close and Far Hypothetical Prefactual groups. However, 
consideration of the raw data of Experiment 8 does not suggest that there is a difference 
between these two groups. 
4.6.1. The Function of Speculative Thinking: A Broad Functional Theory 
According to the functional theory, counterfactual thinking generates thoughts that 
help to regulate behaviors and improve future performance (Epstude & Roese, 2008). Based 
on this, one might expect that counterfactual and prefactual thinking will focus on 
controllable modifications to the same extent (this possibility was the starting point for 
Ferrante’s (2013) study). However, my results diverged from this, suggesting that prefactual 
thinking leads to more controllable modifications than counterfactual thinking. In Experiment 
7, participants thought counterfactually about their unsatisfactory scrambled word 
performance. According to functional theory, it is the perfect time for generating goal-
directed counterfactual thinking. However, participants’ counterfactual thoughts had fewer 
controllable modifications than prefactual thoughts. Similar results were reported by Ferrante 
et al. (2013). They suggested that counterfactual thinking might be less likely to serve a 
preparatory function than prefactual thinking, because counterfactual thinking focused on less 
controllable features than prefactual thinking.  
My results also showed that there is another important dimension in speculative 
thinking. Specifically, participants’ speculative thoughts about an event they expected to 




about a hypothetical event (i.e. Hypothetical Prefactual Thinking). This result suggests that 
thinking about reality serves more preparatory function than thinking about hypotheticals. 
This makes sense because when we know an event is going to happen, there is scope for our 
behaviors to change the outcome. Whereas when an event is hypothetical, this is not the case. 
I suggest that as long as people realize that an outcome remains open to change (i.e. thinking 
about future) and realize that an outcome can actually be changed (i.e. thinking about reality) 
people would prepare for the outcomes by generating controllable modifications that are the 
content people can use to improve the outcomes. 
Therefore, my findings are the first to demonstrate that there are two dimensions of 
speculative thinking that influence the controllability of the modifications. These are the 
temporal dimension, where people are more likely to generate controllable modifications 
about future events, and the hypothetical dimension, where people are more likely to generate 
controllable modifications about real events. Previous research (e.g. Ferrante et al., 2013; 
Epstude et al., 2016) did not distinguish between real and hypothetical events in prefactual 
thinking. If we want people’s speculative thoughts to change future behaviour, my results 
suggest that they should think about future events rather than past, but equally importantly, 
they should think about real anticipated events, rather than hypothetical ones. This fits with a 
growing body of literature showing that thinking about real events differs from thinking 
about hypothetical events (e.g. Camerer and Mobbs, 2017). 
Epstude & Roese’s (2008) functional theory proposed that counterfactuals affect 
subsequent behaviors through the content-specific pathway. The subsequent behaviors are 
related to the specific information in counterfactual thinking. For example, if a person gets 
wet because they forgot to bring an umbrella, then this person might think counterfactually 
that “I could have remembered to bring umbrella”, and will prepare an umbrella to avoid 




specific pathway, they must have controllable modifications. Other types of speculative 
thought can include controllable modifications and, thus, could also use this content-specific 
pathway. In fact, my results suggest that speculative thinking about the future and about real 
events (compared to counterfactuals that are past and hypothetical) might be more likely to 
generate the kind of controllable thoughts that would be suitable for this pathway. 
4.6.2. Conclusion 
Overall, I showed that both temporal and reality dimensions have impact on people’s 
speculative thoughts, resulting in significant differences in controllable modifications. I 
confirmed the existence of the temporal dimension, as reported by Ferrante et al. (2013), 
demonstrating that it did not reduce to a reality/hypothetical dimension or a psychological 
distance dimension. But, I also found evidence for a reality/hypothetical dimension. Previous 
research has overlooked whether participants are thinking about events they believe will 
happen (real) or those they believe will not or did not happen (hypothetical), while I provided 
a more comprehensive picture of how different types of speculative thinking might influence 
future behaviors. My findings add to Ferrante et al.’s findings (2013) about the function of 
counterfactual thinking, and speculative thinking more broadly. I discussed whether and how 
counterfactual thinking may influence future behaviors through the content-specific or 
content-neutral pathway. To conclude, I demonstrated different types of speculative thinking 
have different potential to be functional. Overall, I propose a broad functional view of 





Chapter 5  





In two experiments, I explored whether counterfactual thinking and lying are closely 
related as previous studies suggested. Specifically I explored whether lying, like 
counterfactual thinking, focuses on events that were under the agent’s control. Participants 
read short vignettes about protagonists who encountered controllable and uncontrollable 
events and were asked whether they would 1) think counterfactually and 2) lie. Experiment 9 
(N=47) showed that in line with expectations, participants were more likely to say that a 
protagonist experiencing a controllable event would lie than protagonist experiencing an 
uncontrollable event. However, surprisingly, the pattern for counterfactual thinking was 
reversed. Participants were more likely to say that protagonists who experienced 
uncontrollable events would think counterfactually. Experiment 10 (N=110) showed that 
participants expected protagonists to lie about controllable events rather than uncontrollable 
events. But there was no bias in whether participants thought that protagonists would think 
counterfactually about the controllable or uncontrollable events. I concluded that people’s 
expectations about lies are influenced by the controllability of events and that counterfactual 
thinking may not be as closely linked to lying as some previous studies suggested. 
5.2. Introduction 
Counterfactual thinking is the thinking activity that people use for imagining past 
events that could have occurred but did not. People think counterfactually about how things 
could have been different in the past (e.g. Beck, & Riggs, 2014; Beck, Weisberg, Burns, & 
Riggs, 2014; Byrne, 2002; Roese, 1997). Some studies have explored the link between 
counterfactual thinking and deception. For example, Debey, De Houwer, and Verschuere 
(2014) explored whether thinking about the truth forms the basis of lies. In short, the 




indicating “yes” or “no”. Participants were required to lie in response to all the questions. For 
example, student participants should give a “no” answer when answering the question “Are 
you a student”. Researchers recorded participants’ reaction time and accuracy of answering 
these questions. Furthermore, when answering each question, participants were shown 
random “YES” or “NO” words along with the question they answered. For example, for the 
question “Are you a student?” (in which student participants need to answer “no” to lie in 
order to fulfil the experimental requirement), a “YES” or “NO” word appeared to distract the 
participants’ attention. Researchers measured the reaction time and accuracy of participants’ 
answers. Results showed that, compared with when the distraction word represented the lie, 
participants seeing questions when the distraction word represented the truth had shorter 
reaction time and higher accuracy rates for lying. For example, when answering the question 
“Are you a student”, student participants who saw “Yes” gave “No” answer faster and more 
accurately than participants who saw “No”. Researchers suggested that, the activation of truth 
(i.e. seeing the word that represents truth) forms the base of lying (i.e. shorter reaction time 
and higher accuracy rates for lying). Briazu, Walsh, Deeprose, and Ganis (2017) suggested 
that this heuristic mechanism that lies are based on activation of truth is similar to 
counterfactual thinking. This is because even though thinking counterfactually is about things 
that are not true, it is based on what was meant to have happened. 
Shalvi, Dana, Handgraaf, and De Dreu (2011) found that seeing a possible alternative 
outcome to an event can lead to lying. They suggested that is because seeing the alternative 
possible alternative outcome allows people to generate counterfactual thoughts. Specifically, 
researchers used a “die under cup” task, allowing participants to roll a die and check the die 
number in private. In one condition, participants were told that they can only roll the die 
once, and the larger the die number they threw, the more monetary rewards they received. In 




rolled number determined their rewards. Participants in this condition were told that the last 
two rolls were to test that whether the dice are normal. The researchers found that the rolled 
numbers reported by participants in the multiple rolling condition was higher than the normal 
distribution, and higher than in the control condition. Researchers suggested that seeing an 
alternative outcome that participants could have had but did not allowed participants think 
counterfactually about how they could have rolled different number. They further suggested 
that counterfactual thinking generated after seeing the other numbers that they rolled (e.g., “I 
could have rolled larger number”) might lead participants to lie about their rolling number, 
because counterfactual thinking may give people a sense of justification for lying. That is, 
observing the desired alternative can reduce the extent to which people believe that lying is 
unethical, even if these alternatives are not true in the reality (e.g., additional rolls did not 
determine rewards). People use this self-justification to reduce their unethical feeling for 
lying, so that they can feel better about lying. 
However, Briazu et al. (2017) suggested that, generating counterfactuals requires 
people to imagine alternatives in their mind. On the other hand, observing desired alternatives 
(e.g. an additional rolled number that is larger than the actual number) allows participants to 
actually see a desired alternative outcome that almost happened, so participants did not need 
to rely on thinking counterfactually about the desired alternatives in their minds. To further 
explore the direct link between counterfactual thinking and lying, Briazu et al. (2017) 
conducted a series of studies, using stories that can prime counterfactual thinking. Their 
stories were based on previous studies (e.g. Roese & Olson, 1996; Kahneman, & Tversky, 
1982) that indicated closeness and exceptionality are determinants that increase people’s 
likelihood to think counterfactually, as I explored in chapter 2. Based on previous research, in 
one study Briazu et al. (2017) explored whether participants would generate different 




Specially, participants in the high counterfactual thinking group read stories with 
counterfactual determinants, while participants in the low counterfactual thinking group read 
stories without counterfactual determinants. For example, for closeness, one story with 
closeness was about imagining a car that was hit had only been parked for few moments, and 
the corresponding story without closeness was about imagining a car that was hit had been 
parked for a long time. For exceptionality, one story with exceptionality was about imagining 
you are a person who rarely watches movies that chooses to go to the cinema rather than 
attend your neighbors’ party. The corresponding story without exceptionality was about 
imagining you are a person who often watches movies that chooses to go to the cinema rather 
than attend your neighbors’ party. After reading stories, participants answered some questions 
about spontaneous lying (e.g. “write down anything you would say to the police…” for the 
closeness stories; “write down anything you would say to the neighbour if asked why you 
failed to attend the party…”). The results showed that participants reading stories with 
counterfactual determinants generated more lies than participants reading stories without 
counterfactual determinants.  
In another study, Briazu et al. (2017) explored whether, when reading both stories 
with and without counterfactual determinants, participants think that the protagonist in the 
story with counterfactual determinants would be more likely to lie than the other protagonist.  
Participants read some stories with and without exceptionality (as a counterfactual 
determinant). For example, one story with exceptionality was about a protagonist crashing his 
car on the daily route, and the corresponding story without exceptionality was about a 
protagonist crashing his car on a new route. After that, participants answered a question about 
which protagonist was more likely to lie. The results showed that participants tended to think 
that the protagonist experiencing the exceptional events rather than the unexceptional events 




situation that counterfactual alternatives are available in (i.e. counterfactual determinants) can 
lead to lying compared to situation that counterfactual alternatives are less available. 
Researchers suggested that it reflects the close link between counterfactual thinking and 
lying.  
However, Briazu et al. (2017) did not explore whether these counterfactual 
determinants (e.g. closeness and exceptionality) would lead to participants lying and thinking 
counterfactually to different extents, because there was no question about counterfactual 
thinking in their studies. Therefore, there are possibilities that closeness (or exceptionality) is 
more likely to lead to counterfactual thinking than lying, or closeness (or exceptionality) is 
more likely to lead to lying than counterfactual thinking. The general goal of this chapter is to 
revisit the relationship between counterfactual thinking and lying. That is because research on 
the relationship between counterfactual thinking and lying lacks direct comparison between 
counterfactual thinking and lying, although there is increasing research in this area. Based on 
this general goal, the specific goal of this chapter is to explore whether same counterfactual 
determinant can lead to different extents of counterfactual thinking and lying. Especially, I 
chose controllability as the variable to compare the relationship between counterfactual 
thinking and lying, exploring whether controllability as one specific counterfactual 
determinant would lead participants to infer counterfactual thinking and lying differently. In 
this chapter, I look at controllability (as a different determinant of counterfactual thinking) to 
broaden the research that had gone before. 
Research on controllability suggested that controllability can lead to counterfactual 
thinking. For example, Mandel and Lehman (1996) explored people’s counterfactual thoughts 
when reading both controllable (e.g., the protagonist chose an irregular route to go home) and 
uncontrollable events (e.g., A truck did not obey the traffic rules and hit). Researchers asked 




needed to generate counterfactual thoughts for the protagonist. Results showed that 
participants’ counterfactual thoughts mainly focused on the controllable actions that 
protagonist did (e.g. “he should have chosen another route”), rather than uncontrollable 
events. Girotto, Legrenzi, and Rizzo (1991) asked participants to generate counterfactual 
thoughts for one protagonist who was delayed by both controllable events (e.g. having a 
drink) and uncontrollable events (e.g. road blocked by a flock of sheep), and when the 
protagonist came home he found his wife had just died because of heart attack. Researchers 
found that participants’ counterfactual thoughts mainly focused on protagonist’s controllable 
action (e.g. “he could have come home earlier and saved his wife if he did not have a drink”). 
The functional theory of counterfactual thinking (e.g., Epstude & Roese, 2008; Roese & 
Epstude, 2017) focused on controllability. This theory suggested that counterfactual thinking 
focusing on controllable events or actions is helpful for promoting future performance, since 
people can only make efforts to improve the controllable parts.  
On the other hand, there have been some contrasting results suggesting counterfactual 
thinking does not focus on controllable features. These studies suggested that controllability 
may not be as effective in generating counterfactual thinking. Girotto, Ferrante, Pighin, and 
Gonzalez (2007) divided participants into actor and reader conditions. Participants in the 
actor condition needed to choose either a simple or difficult task to perform, while 
participants in the reader condition read a story about one protagonist choosing either a 
simple or difficult task and experiencing task failure. All participants were then asked to 
generate counterfactual thoughts about their task performance or the story they read. Results 
showed that participants in the actor rather than reader condition generated more 
counterfactual thoughts focusing on uncontrollable features. Researchers suggested that this 
is due to the difference between reader and actor. A reader of a counterfactual story can 




what action can change the outcome. But a person who has actual experience may easily 
retrieve many experiences from memory. These experiences can often include many 
situational aspects that are not controllable for people themselves. Researchers further 
suggested that previous findings that counterfactual thinking tends to focus on controllable 
features might be due to using reader rather than actor paradigms. Furthermore, Pighin, 
Byrne, Ferrante, Gonzalez, and Girotto (2011) adapted this design, dividing participants into 
reader and observer conditions. Participants in the reader condition needed to read a story 
about a protagonist who chose one task and failed. Participants in the observer condition 
actually observed that a person chose a task and failed. Researchers found that, like actors, 
counterfactual thinking generated by an observer who actually observed a failed experience 
focused on fewer controllable features than counterfactual thinking generated by a reader 
who read about a failed experience.  
In summary, previous research on the relation between counterfactual thinking and 
lying was concerned with some specific counterfactual determinants (e.g., closeness, 
exceptionality). In this chapter, the specific research goal is to see whether controllability (as 
a counterfactual determinant) specifically impacts on counterfactual thinking and lying in 
same was as other determinants. Furthermore, the functional theory of counterfactual 
thinking (e.g. Epstude & Roese, 2008) defines controllability as the key to counterfactual 
thinking’s preparatory function. That is because people can only improve the event that is 
controllable. However, current counterfactual thinking research has begun to question 
controllability (as a counterfactual determinant) for generating counterfactual thinking. 
Therefore, the preparatory function that counterfactual thinking serves is challenged. The 
general research goal of this chapter is to look at the relationship between counterfactual 
thinking and lying, which can help us to understand counterfactual thinking’s function in 




My Experiment 9 explored how participants would infer controllability in questions 
about counterfactual thinking and lying. Specifically I explored whether participants would 
think that counterfactual thinking/lying is more likely to occur after controllable or 
uncontrollable events. In Experiment 9, participants read short vignettes about protagonists 
who encountered controllable and uncontrollable events and were asked whether they would 
1) think counterfactually and 2) lie. If previous research (e.g., Epstude and Roese, 2008) on 
controllability leading to counterfactual thinking is right, and previous research (e.g., Briazu 
et al., 2017) on the relationship between counterfactual thinking and lying is right, then the 
first possibility would be that participants will think the protagonist in the controllable story 
is more likely to think counterfactually and lie than the protagonist in the uncontrollable 
story. But if previous research (e.g., Girotto et al., 2007) on controllability not leading to 
counterfactual thinking is right, then the second possibility would be that participants think 
the protagonist in the controllable story is less likely to think counterfactually and lie than the 
protagonist in the uncontrollable story. As I discussed earlier in section 5.2, it is possible that 
counterfactual determinants lead to lying and counterfactual thinking to varying extents, then 
the third possibility would be that participants would allocate different 
controllable/uncontrollable protagonist to the counterfactual thinking and lying questions. 
My Experiment 10 explored that whether participants are likely to focus on the 
controllable or uncontrollable event when facing questions about counterfactual thinking and 
lying. In Experiment 10, participants read short vignettes about protagonists who thought 
counterfactually or lied, and they were asked whether the protagonist encounters controllable 
or uncontrollable events. Experiment 10 advances our knowledge from Experiment 9. 
Specifically, what Experiment 9 explored is participants’ judgments about counterfactual 
thinking and lies based on knowing controllable stories and uncontrollable stories. 




will occur, how participants make judgments about controllable and uncontrollable events. If 
previous research on controllability leading to counterfactual thinking, and previous research 
on the relationship between counterfactual thinking and lying are right, then the first 
possibility would be that participants in the counterfactual and lying conditions are more 
likely to focus on the controllable event than uncontrollable event. But if previous research 
on controllability not leading to counterfactual thinking is right, then the second possibility 
would be that participants in the counterfactual and lying conditions are less likely to focus 
on the controllable event than uncontrollable event. Similarly to Experiment 9, the third 
possibility would be that participants would focus on different controllable or uncontrollable 
events for the counterfactual thinking and lying conditions. Combining Experiments 9 and 10, 
I can better understand the relationship between controllability and lying/counterfactual 
thinking from two directions (i.e. inferring lying/counterfactual thinking based on knowing 
controllability, and inferring controllability based on knowing lying/counterfactual).  




47 psychology students (39 women, 8 men) of the University of Birmingham 
participated to gain course credits. No individual participated in more than one experiment 
reported in this chapter. 
5.3.1.2. Design & Materials  
I adapted the parcel stories from Briazu et al. (2017, experiment 2). In the original 




because they had coffee after work. In my study, I adapted the stories into that two 
protagonists were delayed by either their own decision of having coffee (controllable event), 
or by traffic light being broken (uncontrollable event). Each participant read both versions of 
stories, and answered both counterfactual thinking and lying questions. In order to avoid the 
possibility that participants might infer the two events (i.e. waiting for the broken traffic light, 
and having coffee) take different time, I added the same time indicators (i.e. half hour) for 
two events. That is, the broken traffic light and having coffee both delayed the protagonist for 
half an hour. 
In order to avoid the potential order effect that the order of presenting controllable and 
uncontrollable versions of stories might affect participants’ answers, I counterbalanced the 
order in which the controllable and uncontrollable versions of stories were presented. I also 
counterbalanced the order of presenting counterfactual thinking and lying. In summary, each 
half of participants read either a story about protagonist who was delayed by having coffee or 
a story about protagonist who was delayed by traffic light being broken first, in which each 
half of participants were first asked the counterfactual thinking or lying question.  
The two stories were both on the same page, and then the two questions were 
presented separately on two pages.  
The stories and questioned asked in Experiment 9 are included in the Appendix I. 
5.3.1.3. Procedure 
The experimenter greeted the participants and asked them to complete the consent 
form. Participants completed the study in a quiet room alone. 
Depending on the controllability order, participants either read the story about the 
protagonist who was delayed by having coffee or the story about the protagonist who was 
delayed by traffic light being broken first. After that, participants were given the first question 




question to answer. Depending on the question order, the first (second) question was the 
counterfactual thinking question that “Although you cannot tell for sure from the reading 
materials, who spends more time thinking about how things could have been different?”, and 
the second (first) question was the lying question that “Although you cannot tell for sure from 
the reading materials, who would be more likely to lie to their parents about why they were 
late?” 
Participants were thanked and debriefed. 
5.3.2. Results 
In order to avoid the possible impact of participants’ different English proficiency on 
reading stories and answering questions, my data analysis excluded non-native English 
speakers’ data. Eight participants’ data were excluded from analysis, leaving 40 native 
English speakers’ data. Data are summarized in Table 9. There was no order effect of 
presenting controllable and uncontrollable versions of stories in the pattern of inferring which 
protagonist was more likely to think counterfactually and lie: Counterfactual thinking 
question, Fisher’s Exact Test (1, N = 40) p > .999, Cramer’s V = .03; Lying question, Fisher’s 
Exact Test (1, N = 40) p = .475, Cramer’s V = .17. Also, there was no question order effect of 
presenting counterfactual thinking and lying questions in the pattern of inferring which 
protagonist was more likely to think counterfactually and lie: Counterfactual thinking 
question, Fisher’s Exact Test (1, N = 40) p = .491, Cramer’s V = .15; Lying question, Fisher’s 
Exact Test (1, N = 40) p > .999, Cramer’s V = .15. 
Second, I explored whether participants were more likely to choose the protagonist 
experiencing a controllable or uncontrollable event in counterfactual thinking and lying 
questions, using binomial tests to compare the responses in two questions. For the 
counterfactual thinking question, surprisingly, participants were more likely to say that the 




protagonist experiencing the controllable event, p = .017. However, in line with previous 
literature on lying, for the lying question participants were more likely to say that protagonist 
experiencing the controllable event was likely to lie than protagonist experiencing the 
uncontrollable event, p < .001. 
To sum up, in Experiment 9 I found that there is a difference in inferring 





Table 9. Number of participants choosing the protagonist who experienced 







Questions Counterfactual 12 28 
 Lying 39 1 
 
5.4. Experiment 10: Controllability Focus in Counterfactual Thinking and Lying 
Questions 
In Experiment 9, I found that participants inferred that the protagonist experiencing 
the uncontrollable event (compared to the controllable event) was more likely to think 
counterfactually. However, I found that participants inferred that the protagonist experiencing 
the controllable event (compared to uncontrollable event) was more likely to lie. These 
results are inconsistent with my expectation based on previous research with other 
counterfactual determinants (i.e. closeness and exceptionality).  
Experiment 10 explored that, when participants know that someone is lying or 
thinking counterfactually, do they think the content will be controllable or uncontrollable. 
This design allows me to have a more comprehensive understanding of the difference 
between counterfactual thinking and lying in controllability. Specifically, based on 
Experiment 9 (demonstrating that participants were more likely to say that protagonist 
experiencing the controllable event was likely to lie than protagonist experiencing the 
uncontrollable event), I hypothesized that participants would think the protagonist was more 




found that participants were more likely to choose the uncontrollable event when answering 
the counterfactual thinking question, which is inconsistent with some previous counterfactual 
thinking studies. Based on these contrasting findings, Experiment 10 has three possibilities 
for the counterfactual thinking and lying questions. If previous research on controllability 
leading to counterfactual thinking, and previous research on the relationship between 
counterfactual thinking and lying are right, then the first possibility is that participants in both 
counterfactual and lying conditions would think the protagonist was more likely to think 
counterfactually and lie about the controllable event than the uncontrollable event. But if 
previous research on controllability not leading to counterfactual thinking is right, then the 
second possibility is that participants in both counterfactual and lying conditions would think 
the protagonist was not more likely to think counterfactually and lie about the controllable 
event than the uncontrollable event. The third possibility is that participants in counterfactual 
and lying conditions would have different answers on whether the protagonist was more 
likely to think counterfactually and lie about the controllable or uncontrollable event. 
5.4.1. Method 
5.4.1.1. Participants 
110 psychology students (97 women, 13 men) from the University of Birmingham 
participated in this experiment to gain course credits.  
5.4.1.2. Design & Materials  
Participants were alternately assigned to one of two conditions: the Counterfactual 
Thinking condition or Lying condition. All participants read the same story about a 
protagonist who was delayed by both controllable (i.e. stopping for coffee) and 
uncontrollable (i.e. traffic light being broken) events. The stories in Experiment 10 were 




protagonist was delayed by a controllable event and an uncontrollable event, while in the 
story in Experiment 9 the two protagonists were each delayed by a controllable or an 
uncontrollable event respectively. Participants in the counterfactual thinking condition were 
asked “Alison thinks about how things could have been different. What do you think she is 
more likely to think about”. Participants in the lying condition were asked “Alison lies to her 
parents about why she arrived home when she did. What do you think she is more likely to lie 
about?” 
In order to avoid the possibility that participants might infer the two events (i.e. 
having coffee, and traffic light being broken) take different time (which might affect my 
results), I added the same time indicators of half hour for two events as in Experiment 9. In 
order to avoid the potential order effect of presenting controllable or uncontrollable event first 
on participants’ judgment, I counterbalanced the order in which the controllable and 
uncontrollable events were presented. That is, each half of participants in each condition read 
either the protagonist was delayed by having coffee or traffic light being broken first.  
The stories and question asked in Experiment 10 are included in the Appendix J. 
5.4.1.3. Procedure 
The experimenter greeted the participants and asked them to complete the consent 
form. Participants completed the study in a quiet room alone. 
Depending on the controllability order, participants either read the parcel story having 
the controllable event first or read the parcel story having the uncontrollable event first. After 
that, participants in the counterfactual thinking condition were asked, “Alison thinks about 
how things could have been different. What do you think she is more likely to think about: A. 
Things could have been better if I didn’t stop for coffee. B. Things could have been better if 
the traffic light wasn’t broken.” I presented the answer options in the same order as the two 




condition were asked, “Alison lies to her parents about why she arrived home when she did. 
What do you think she is more likely to lie about: A. The traffic light being broken B. 
Stopping for coffee.” 
Participants were thanked and debriefed. 
5.4.2. Results 
In Experiment 10, my data analysis also excluded non-native English speakers’ data. 
21 participants’ data were excluded from the analysis, leaving 89 native English speakers’ 
data. Data are summarized in Table 10. There was no order effect of presenting the 
controllable or uncontrollable event first in the pattern of choosing the controllable or 
uncontrollable event for the counterfactual thinking and lying questions: Fisher’s Exact Test 
(1, N = 89) p > .999, Cramer’s V < .01.  
Second, I made a comparison between the counterfactual thinking and lying 
conditions. A chi square test showed that, there was a difference in the pattern of choosing the 
controllable event option between the counterfactual thinking and lying conditions: χ2 (1, N = 
89) = 15.74, p < .001, Cramer's V = .42. I then explored whether participants were more 
likely to choose the controllable event option in counterfactual thinking and lying conditions, 
using binomial tests. Following the results of Experiment 9, in the counterfactual thinking 
condition, participants were not more likely to infer that the protagonist was likely to think 
counterfactually about the controllable than uncontrollable event, p = .349. In the lying 
condition, participants were more likely to say that protagonist was likely lie about the 
controllable than uncontrollable event, p < .001. 
To sum up, in Experiment 10, I found that the lying did lead participants to focus 
more on the controllable event than the uncontrollable event, while counterfactual thinking 









Controllable event Uncontrollable event 
Conditions Counterfactual 24 17 
 Lying 45 3 
 
5.5. Discussions of Experiments 9 and 10 
This chapter uses controllability to explore the connection between counterfactual 
thinking and deception. In Experiment 9, I found that, after reading both controllable and 
uncontrollable stories, participants were more likely to choose that the protagonist in the 
uncontrollable story would think counterfactually than the protagonist in the controllable 
story; while participants were more likely to choose that the protagonist in the controllable 
story would lie than the protagonist in the uncontrollable story. In Experiment 10, I found 
that, after reading a story containing both controllable and uncontrollable information, 
participants who knew the protagonist planned to lie focused on controllable than 
uncontrollable information, while participants who knew the protagonist would think 
counterfactually did not focus on controllable than uncontrollable information. 
To consider the power of Experiments 9 and 10 to detect the effects of interest, I 
compared the sample sizes of Experiments 9 and 10 with the sample size of previous 
research. In Experiment 9 (N = 47 with two conditions) and Experiment 10 (N = 110 with 
two conditions), I adapted Briazu et al.’s experiment (2017) in which they recruited 123 




the sample size of previous experiment. It would give me less power to identify a significant 
effect, although I have found the effects. It is noteworthy that Experiment 9 showed a 
significant effect of the uncontrollable event on counterfactual thinking, but Experiment 10 
with a bigger sample size did not show a difference between focusing on controllable and 
uncontrollable content when answering the counterfactual thinking question. This difference 
in results patterns between Experiments 9 and 10 may be explained by the different designs 
between Experiment 9 and Experiment 10. Specifically, in Experiment 10 participants only 
needed to answer one question (i.e., either the counterfactual thinking or lying question) 
depending on the condition they were assigned into. On the other hand, participants in 
Experiment 9 needed to answer both a counterfactual thinking question and a lying question. 
In Experiment 9, the counterfactual thinking question and lying question are different, but the 
answer options for the two questions are the same (i.e., “Alison” and “Ella”). There is a 
possibility that participants may tend to select different answer options for two different 
questions when they found that two different questions have the same set of answer options. 
Some studies suggested that counterfactual thinking that represents how past events 
could have been different can lead to lies (e.g. Briazu et al., 2017; Shalvi et al., 2011). For 
example, Shalvi et al. (2011) found that participants were more likely to lie about die-rolling 
when they saw alternative dice results that can lead to counterfactual thinking. Researchers 
suggested that this was because seeing counterfactual alternatives can make participants feel 
psychologically close to the desired dice numbers, which indicated closeness. Lelieveld, 
Shalvi, and Crone (2016) used similar die-rolling paradigm to study participants’ neurological 
responses to evaluating others’ lies about dice results. They suggested that, lying about a 
counterfactual alternative that is closer to the truth is more likely to be considered as the 
justifiable lie than lying about purely imaginative alternative that is farther to the truth. Briazu 




that people think it is acceptable to themselves and others. These studies linking 
counterfactual thinking and lying explored the determinants of closeness and exceptionality, 
but not the determinant of controllability. Therefore the link between counterfactual thinking 
and lying might not be applicable in all situations.  
As for the link between controllability and counterfactual thinking, Experiment 9 
found that participants assigned uncontrollability to the counterfactual thinking question, and 
Experiment 10 found that participants did not focus more on controllable information when 
thinking counterfactually. One way to explain this is to look at Roese et al.’s research (2017). 
They suggested that if an activity is initiated by others rather than by people themselves, 
counterfactual thinking generated is more likely to focus on uncontrollable information, while 
counterfactual thinking is more likely to focus on controllable information if an activity is 
initiated by people themselves. Researchers found that when participants described self-
initiated events like deciding to go to a movie, buying gifts for others, or preparing family 
dinner, counterfactual thinking generated by these events was more likely to focus on 
controllable features. On the other hand, they found that participants’ counterfactual thinking 
was more likely to focus on uncontrollable features when describing others-initiated events 
like taking exams written by teachers, going to a movie chosen by friends, or having dinner 
prepared by others. The explanation is, being required to read the counterfactual thinking and 
lying stories is an activity initiated by others, rather than self-initiated activity. Although the 
events in the stories are self-initiated by the protagonists, the act of reading the story in 
initiated by another person – the researcher. Therefore I might expect participants to focus on 
uncontrollable events when thinking counterfactually. The previous research provides an 
explanation for my results that participants thought the character experiencing the 
uncontrollable event (compared to the controllable event) is more likely to think 




controllable and uncontrollable content when knowing the character thinking counterfactually 
(Experiment 10).  A surprising point is that this explanation would still lead to expecting 
counterfactual thinking has same pattern with lying. However the results for lying questions 
do not follow the pattern of counterfactual thinking questions.  
These different results between counterfactual thinking and lying require a new 
hypothesis to explain them. I proposed a blame-control hypothesis to explain the difference 
results for inferring controllability between lying and counterfactual thinking. This 
hypothesis includes two points: 1. Counterfactual thinking and lying both focus on avoiding 
being blamed; 2. Counterfactual thinking is a self-directed activity (i.e., things that people do 
to themselves), and lying is a social activity (i.e., things that people do to others). For 
example, when something upsetting happens, self-comfort (that is a self-directed activity) can 
make us feel better; while when upsetting things happen to others, we can also comfort 
others, which is a social activity.  
When people think counterfactually about an outcome, people focus on themselves, 
and they are motivated to avoid blame (self-blame in this case). Therefore, people focus on 
the uncontrollable event. On the contrary, when people are lying about an outcome, people 
focus on what other people think, they are motivated to avoid blame (from others), so they 
lied about the controllable event. Specifically, for counterfactual thinking, if an event was 
controllable, but ultimately led to bad outcome, people will blame themselves (e.g. “things 
could have been better if I did not drink coffee”). On the other hand, for lying, if an event was 
controllable, but ultimately led to bad outcome, people may assume they will receive blame 
from others. The motivation of avoiding self-blame may lead people not to pay attention to 
controllable events when thinking counterfactually, because it will enable people to reduce 
the regret generated by counterfactual thinking (e.g. “I could have not drunk the coffee”). On 




about controllable events (e.g., “I did not have coffee”).  
There is no literature specifically discussing the blame effect on the difference in 
controllability between lying and counterfactual thinking, mainly due to blame. But there is 
literature on two aspects: 1. the controllability that people perceived over events can lead to 
self-blame; 2. people lie to avoid blame. There is research suggesting that self-blame is 
related to the perceived control (e.g. Tennen, Affleck, & Gershman, 1986; Vasconcelos e Sa, 
Barrowclough, Hartley, & Wearden, 2017). For example, Tennen, et al. (1986) focused on 
self-blame among mothers whose infants were in hospital for serious perinatal complications. 
The mothers were interviewed in their homes about 2 months after their infants had been 
discharged from intensive care. The first interview question was about what they thought to 
be the cause of their infants’ medical problems. Participants’ answers to this question were 
classified into either about blaming themselves, or about blaming others, external 
environment, and chance. Participants also evaluated how much they thought they had 
control over the medical problems. They needed to indicate on a 10 point scale how much 
they thought they had control (1 = the outcome was not under control at all, 10 = the outcome 
was totally under control). Results showed that mothers’ perceived control over the medical 
problems and recovery of infants is positively related to parents’ self-blame after having 
infants discharged. For example, if a participant thought the cause of her infant’s medical 
problem (e.g., cervical disorder) is due to external causes (i.e., blaming others), the 
participant would perceive less control over the medical problems and recovery of infants; if 
a participant thought the cause of medical problem is due to internal causes (i.e., self-blame), 
the participant would perceive more control. Also, Vasconcelos e Sa, Barrowclough, Hartley, 
and Wearden (2017) suggested that as the level of self-blame increases, people attribute more 
controllability to the past events, and people will also increase their sense of control over 




controllable (i.e. could have been controllable). 
I suggested that, counterfactual thinking that things could have been controllable can 
make people perceive they had control over the event, which makes people to generate self-
blame for controllable events. Specifically, when answering the counterfactual thinking 
question, or reading a protagonist thinking counterfactually, my participants may think about 
self-blame. They might then think that the protagonist would need to focus on the 
uncontrollable event to avoid self-blame. Also, Tennen, et al. (1986) suggested that people 
have self-protective motives to avoid blame from others. Therefore, when answering the 
question about lying, or reading a protagonist thinking counterfactually, the motive of 
avoiding blame from others may lead participants to focus on the controllable events.  
5.5.1. Conclusion 
Experiment 9 showed that participants answering the counterfactual thinking question 
were more likely to say that the protagonist in the uncontrollable story was likely to think 
counterfactually than protagonist in the controllable story; while participants answering the 
lying question were more likely to say that protagonist in the controllable story was likely to 
lie than protagonist in the uncontrollable story. Experiment 10 showed that participants who 
knew the protagonist planned to lie focused more on controllable than uncontrollable 
information. Participants who knew the protagonist thought counterfactually did not focus 
more on controllable than uncontrollable information. Although counterfactual thinking and 
lying are closely related in some ways (Briazu et al., 2017), in these experiments I found that 
lying seemed to be influenced by the controllability of events in a way that counterfactual 
thinking was not. I discuss the possibilities that the motive of avoiding self-blame may lead 
participants not to focus on the controllable events in the questions about counterfactual 
thinking; and the motive of avoiding blame from others may lead participants to focus on the 











In this thesis, I explore the functions of speculative thinking through four 
experimental chapters. Specifically, I explore the functions of speculative thinking from a 
broader perspective than the traditional Functional Theory, and compare the functions of 
speculative thinking about the past and future. Among these four experimental chapters, two 
explore some non-preparatory functions of speculative thinking that have not been widely 
discussed, which are the function of conveying information (Chapter 2), and the function of 
supporting lying (Chapter 5). The other two experimental chapters explore the temporal 
asymmetry in speculative thinking, in which one chapter focuses on construal levels in 
speculative thinking about the past and future (Chapter 3) and one chapter focuses on 
temporal asymmetry and reality / hypothetical difference in the preparatory function of 
speculative thinking (Chapter 4). In general, this thesis suggests that a broader functional 
theory is needed to discuss non-preparatory functions and traditional preparatory function. 
Also, the broader functional theory should cover all speculative thinking of the past and 
future instead of just counterfactual thinking. 
In chapter 2 (Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 4), I explored the function of past speculative 
thinking that is conveying information from others’ counterfactuals. I found that the existence 
(but not the numbers) of counterfactual thoughts can lead people to infer that event is close, 
exceptional, and controllable, which suggests that the relation between closeness / 
controllability / exceptionality and counterfactual thinking is bidirectional. In chapter 3 
(Experiment 5), I compared general speculative thinking about the past and future. I found 
that that people use different levels of construal to represent activities differently along the far 
/ close dimension and the past / future dimension. In chapter 4 (Experiments 6, 7, and 8), I 
compared the preparatory function of speculative thinking about the past and future. I found 




resulting in significant differences in controllable modifications. In chapter 5 (Experiments 9 
and 10), I explored the link between lying and counterfactual thinking. I found that that 
people’s expectations about lies are influenced by the controllability of events and that 
counterfactual thinking may not be as closely linked to lying as some previous studies 
suggested. 
In general, this thesis expands the functional theory of counterfactual thinking (i.e. 
Epstude & Roese, 2008) that has mainly been concerned with the preparatory function of 
counterfactual thinking. Firstly, this thesis extends the object of interest from the narrow 
sense of counterfactual thinking to general speculative thinking. This thesis includes 
counterfactual thinking, prefactual thinking, and other speculative thinking about the past and 
future. Secondly, this thesis extends the function (discussed in the functional theory) from the 
narrow sense of preparatory function to the function of conveying information, the function 
of generating lies, the reality / hypothetical difference in the preparatory function, and the 
temporal asymmetry in the functions. My thesis can give a more comprehensive picture of 
functions of speculative thinking from the perspectives of inferences, general speculative 
thinking, construal level, and deception, which can enrich the functional theory of 
counterfactual thinking.  
6.2. Non-Preparatory Functions of Counterfactual Thinking 
The traditional functional theory (Epstude & Roese, 2008) focuses on the preparatory 
function of counterfactual thinking. Focusing on some non-preparatory functions of 
counterfactual thinking can help us to more understand the functions of speculative thinking. 
Specifically, my chapter 2 explores the function of counterfactual thinking to convey 
information. My chapter 5 revisits the function of counterfactual thinking to support lying, 




6.2.1. Function of Conveying Information 
Chapter 2 showed that on knowing that someone has made counterfactual statements, 
people can make inferences of closeness, controllability, and exceptionality. Combining 
previous research (on determinants leading to counterfactual thinking), chapter 2 suggested 
that the relation between closeness / controllability / exceptionality and counterfactual 
thinking is bidirectional. The functional theory suggested that counterfactual thinking can 
help people to identify key determinants of outcome based on counterfactual worlds. My 
chapter 2 showed that this also works when people are thinking about the 3rd person. This 
suggests that, like our own counterfactual thoughts, others’ counterfactual thoughts can also 
help us to identify key determinants of outcome. From reading and listening others’ 
counterfactual thoughts, people can infer that this character who thought counterfactually 
could have caught the flight if they came earlier.  Therefore counterfactual thinking serves a 
function of conveying information to listeners.  
As I discussed in chapter 2, there is already a relatively small literature on how people 
understand others’ counterfactuals. Previous experiments (e.g. De Vega & Urrutia, 2012; 
Ferguson & Sanford, 2008; Santamaría, Espino, & Byrne, 2005) showed that people 
represent different alternative possibilities in mind when understanding counterfactual 
information compared to factual information and that they generate inferences consistent with 
the counterfactual world. In chapter 2, I went beyond this by looking at the inferences that 
people draw from others’ counterfactual thoughts. We already know that determinants exist 
that influence the tendency for people to generate their own counterfactual thoughts, and now 
I found that people’s inferences drawn from others’ counterfactual thoughts are influenced in 
a similar way. To sum up, chapter 2 demonstrated that the inferential relation between 
counterfactual thinking and its determinants was bidirectional. On hearing people make 




Specifically, we are biased to think that events that prompt counterfactual statements were 
psychologically close, controllable, and exceptional. 
6.2.2 Revisiting the Function of Counterfactual Thinking Supporting Lying  
The above section discussed that counterfactual thinking has a non-preparatory  
function that enables people to gain information from other people’s counterfactual thoughts. 
This section explores another non-preparatory function of counterfactual thinking to support 
lying. As I discussed in chapter 5, some previous studies suggested that counterfactual 
thinking that represents how past events could have been different can lead to lies (e.g. Briazu 
et al., 2017; Shalvi et al., 2011). However, in chapter 5, when exploring the potential function 
of counterfactual thinking to support lying, I found that counterfactual thinking and lying are 
not closely related in the aspect of controllability.  
Based on the functional theory of counterfactual thinking (Epstude & Roese, 2008; 
Roese & Epstude, 2017), chapter 5 can inform ideas about preparatory function. Specifically, 
chapter 5 discussed the possibilities that the motive of avoiding self-blame may lead 
participants not to focus on the controllable events in the questions about counterfactual 
thinking; and the motive of avoiding blame from others may lead participants to focus on the 
controllable events in the questions about lying. This suggestion in chapter 5 provided a 
possibility that counterfactual thinking and lying may have different degrees of the 
preparatory function to regulate/change future behaviours. That is, according to the functional 
theory, controllability is the focus of preparatory function, which serves the function to 
improve and change future behaviours. In order for counterfactual thinking to help people 
perform better in future similar events, counterfactual thoughts need to focus on things that 
the individual can control, because people can only make efforts to improve the controllable 
parts. However, chapter 5 demonstrated that counterfactual thinking is less closely linked to 




may be surprising. On the other hand, Ferrante et al. (2013) and the results of chapter 4 in this 
thesis showed that counterfactual thinking does not always focus on controllable events. 
Following this vein, an intriguing possibility is that lying might have a larger influence on 
future behaviors than counterfactual thinking, suggesting that people who was lying about 
one action may have stronger motivation to change wrong action in future than people who 
was thinking counterfactually.  
In chapter 5, I discussed the possibility that people’s counterfactual thoughts may 
focus on controllable events only when some conditions are met (e.g. self-initiated activities 
instead of other-initiated activities), otherwise people’s counterfactual thoughts may focus on 
uncontrollable events. Also, I proposed a blame-control hypothesis to explain the difference 
results for inferring controllability between lying and counterfactual thinking. In general, the 
motive of lying to avoid blame from others, and the motive of thinking counterfactually to 
avoid blame from self, both result in lying focusing more on controllable events than 
counterfactual thinking. 
6.3. Asymmetries in Functions of Speculative Thinking 
In chapters 3 and 4 I explored two asymmetries in functions of speculative thinking. 
First I found that there is temporal asymmetry in speculative thinking, demonstrating the 
difference between speculative thinking about the past and future. In addition, I found that 
there is a reality/hypothetical difference in speculative thinking, demonstrating the difference 
between speculative thinking about the reality and hypothetical events. Specifically, chapter 3 
explored temporal asymmetry in the degree of abstraction people use to describe events. 
Chapter 4 explored the roles of both temporal asymmetry and reality/hypothetical difference 
on the preparatory function of speculative thinking. 
6.3.1. Temporal Asymmetry in Construal Level of Speculative Thinking  




elicited less abstract descriptions than participants who did speculative thinking about the 
past. This finding demonstrates there is a temporal asymmetry in construal level of 
speculative thinking, showing that speculative thinking about the past leads to higher 
construal level than speculative thinking about the future. Based on previous research on 
comparing construal levels between thinking about different psychological distances (e.g. 
Liberman & Trope, 1998), my chapter 5 made direct comparison between construal levels of 
speculative thinking about the past and future. 
Temporal asymmetry in construal level may also indicate a temporal asymmetry in 
preparatory function of speculative thinking. Based on construal level theory, Speculative 
thinking about the future may serve more preparatory function than speculative thinking 
about the past, because thinking about the future has lower construal level than thinking 
about the past. Specifically, Trope and Liberman (2010) suggested that the function of high 
construal level is to maintain those stable and unchanged features of events, because the high 
level characteristics are more likely to remain unchanged than low level characteristics when 
psychological distance increases or decreases. Because what has happened in the past cannot 
be changed, using high construal level (that maintains the unchanged features of events) to 
represent past events can help people to learn from the past experience. Otherwise, if people 
use low construal level to represent and learn from past experiences, it will bring in lots of 
details and unnecessary burden to people’s mental load. This may be the reason why thinking 
of the past has a higher construal level than thinking of the future. On the other hand, low 
construal level contains specific information about how actions to be performed, which is 
helpful for completing upcoming tasks.  
As I discussed in chapter 3, this result can be linked into discussing about temporal 
asymmetry in psychological distance of speculative thinking. CLT (e.g. Trope & Liberman, 




psychological distance. Based on this, my results suggest that speculative thinking about the 
future may lead to closer psychological distance than thinking about the past. This suggestion 
about temporal asymmetry in psychological distance fits with previous research on thinking 
about the future and past leads to infer different psychological distance (e.g. Caruso et al., 
2013; Rinaldi, et al., 2017). 
Temporal asymmetry in psychological distance may also indicate a temporal 
asymmetry in preparatory function of speculative thinking. Specifically, thinking about close 
psychological distance may be more helpful to prepare future behaviours than thinking about 
far psychological distance. For example, in one study, Peetz, Wilson, and Strahan (2009) 
explored the influence of different psychological distances on the motivation of people’s 
academic performance. Participants in the close condition marked the distance between 
“today” and “graduation” on a timeline spanning 25 years, while the participants in the 
distant condition marked on a timeline spanning 5 years. Because the two timelines had same 
length, the points on the scale spanning 25 years were closer than the scale spanning 5 years. 
Researchers suggested that this manipulation allowed participants to think that (compared to 
the timeline spanning 5 years) the timeline spanning 25 years leads to closer psychological 
distance between the graduation event and now. Participants then evaluated their motivation 
level for academic performance. Compared to participants who marked the event on a 
timeline spanning 5 years (i.e. were primed to think far psychological distance), participants 
who marked the event on a timeline spanning 25 years (i.e. were primed to think close 
psychological distance) were more motivated to improve their academic performance. These 
experiments and chapter jointly suggest that, the psychological difference between 
speculative thinking about the future and past may be the reason that leads to that speculative 




6.3.2. Reality/Hypothetical difference in Speculative Thinking 
Chapter 4 demonstrated that both temporal and reality dimensions have impact on 
people’s speculative thoughts, resulting in significant differences in controllable 
modifications. I confirmed the temporal dimension in speculative thinking, as reported by 
Ferrante et al. (2013). I also found evidence for the reality/hypothetical dimension in 
speculative thinking. This is in line with some moral psychology studies that also suggested a 
reality/hypothetical difference in people’s moral judgement. For example, FeldmanHall et al. 
(2012) explored how people acted differently in moral dilemma in the reality and 
hypothetical moral dilemma. Specifically, researchers used a “pain vs. gain” experimental 
design. In this design, participants were told that a stranger will receive an electric shock 
depending on a decision they make. Participants can choose whether to spend their 
participation rewards (£20) to reduce the electric shock. The greater reduction in the electric 
shock, the more money is needed to spend. In the hypothetical condition, participants only 
need to imagine what they will do. In the real condition, participants needed to do this “pain 
vs gain” task in person, and they were told that the stranger who receives the electric shock is 
sitting in the next room. Results showed that, compared to the hypothetical condition, 
participants in the real condition were more “selfish”. Those who actually did the task were 
willing to spend less money to reduce the electric shock on stranger than those imagining the 
task. Researchers suggested that this is because people focus on the “ought self” (i.e. to 
achieve moral ideal, what I should do) when facing the hypothetical situation; while people 
focus on what action is beneficial for oneself when facing the reality situation.  
My chapter 4 demonstrates the reality/hypothetical difference in speculative thinking, 
showing speculative thinking about the realistic events focuses on more controllable 
modifications than speculative thinking about the hypothetical events. This finding suggests 




thinking about the hypothetical. This result is in line with our intuition. Specifically, for 
activities that we think will actually be carried out, we will focus on how to carry out this 
activity, so the controllable features will be our focus. For activities that we know will not 
actually happen, we can also focus on both the uncontrollable features that cannot be changed 
by ourselves. In summary, as well as temporal asymmetry, I also found the 
reality/hypothetical difference in speculative thinking, which helps us understand the 
preparatory function of speculative thinking. 
6.4. Preparatory Function 
Section 6.4 discusses the preparatory function from the perspective of functional 
theory of counterfactual thinking (Epstude & Roese, 2008).  As I discussed in chapter 1, 
functional theory suggested that counterfactual thinking is helpful for preparing subsequent 
behaviours. Specifically, thinking counterfactually can result in an intention to change 
behaviours, which serves preparatory function for future performance. This theory suggested 
that counterfactual thinking serves preparatory function through two pathways (i.e. one is the 
content-specific pathway, and the other is the content-neutral pathway). According to the 
chapter 4’s results, I discuss preparatory function of counterfactual thinking from the 
perspective of functional theory. I suggest three possibilities for counterfactual thinking to 
serve preparatory function. One possibility is that counterfactual thinking serves preparatory 
function through a content-specific pathway. Another possibility is that counterfactual 
thinking serves preparatory function through a content-neutral pathway. The last possibility is 
that counterfactual thinking has other functions than preparatory function. 
6.4.1. Content-Specific Pathway 
One might wonder whether counterfactual thoughts have a preparatory function. In 
chapter 4, the results showed that thinking counterfactually led to fewer controllable 




modifications are about specific information that can be used to impact future behavior, one 
might accordingly anticipate that thinking counterfactually does not impact on future 
behavior. One possibility, though, is that counterfactuals do still use the content-specific 
pathway to serve preparatory function, just to a lesser degree than prefactual thoughts. That 
is, the content-specific pathway (Epstude & Roese, 2008) suggested that counterfactual 
thinking can influence behaviours by relying on the specific information and meanings 
contained in the original counterfactual thoughts, which is helpful for regulating behaviours 
and improving future performance. This may be consistent with what I discussed (in section 
6.3.1.) that low construal level contains specific information and is helpful for completing 
upcoming tasks. 
As I discussed in chapter 1, Smallman and Roese (2009) found that controllable 
counterfactual modifications that relate to specific information in counterfactual 
modifications are useful for future behavioral intention. In their study, participants read a 
statement describing a negative event (e.g., spilling some milk). Then in counterfactual trials, 
participants read counterfactual thoughts (e.g., “I could have eaten more carefully”). All the 
counterfactual statements participants read were related to specific information about the 
event. In control trials, participants rated how frequently the target behavior from the 
counterfactual (eating carefully) lead to the consequence (spilling milk). In other words, 
participants in the control condition thought only about reality, not about a counterfactual 
world. All participants read a statement about behavioral intention (e.g. “In future I will eat 
more carefully”) and were asked to respond yes or no as to whether they would perform this 
behavior in the future. Entertaining a counterfactual thought reduced participants’ reaction 
times to respond to the behavioral intention judgment compared to the control condition. This 
finding suggests that counterfactual thoughts prime behavioral intentions and that they could 




causally relevant behaviors, this result may suggest that counterfactuals can have some 
impact via the content-specific pathway. However, this impact must be to a lesser extent than 
prefactuals, given the findings of Ferrante et al. and my own. 
6.4.2. Content-Neutral Pathway 
However, an alternative possibility is that counterfactual thoughts influence future 
behaviors through a content-neutral pathway (also proposed by Epstude & Roese (2008) in 
their functional theory). In the content-neutral pathway, information obtained through 
counterfactual thinking affects people’s motivation, which increases effort towards a goal and 
thus affects people’s behaviors (Smallman & Summerville, 2018). Hammell and Chan (2016) 
provided evidence on this in their study which examined whether counterfactual thinking 
leads to actual behavioral change (c.f. behavioral intention). Participants played video games. 
After playing they either thought counterfactually or prefactually about their performance, or 
performed an unrelated filler task. Finally, all participants played the video game again. 
Although the researchers found that participants who thought prefactually generated more 
controllable modifications than participants thinking counterfactually, participants in both the 
prefactual and counterfactual thinking groups improved task performance compared to 
participants performing the filler task. The mismatch between the difference in number of 
controllable modifications that participants generated, but the similarity in improved 
performance suggests that content-neutral pathway, rather than the content-specific pathway, 
was the driver of their behavioral change. Overall, this study suggests that even if 
counterfactual thinking is less likely to focus on controllable modifications it can still be 
functional and impact on future behavior. 
6.4.3. Another Possibility: Counterfactuals Do Not Have Preparatory Function 
It remains possible that counterfactual thinking may not be as useful as prefactual 




events is not the main function of counterfactual thinking. This would be in line with other 
claims that counterfactual thinking might have functions other than the preparatory function. 
For example, some researchers (Kray, George, Liljenquist, Galinsky, Tetlock, & Roese, 2010) 
explored how counterfactual thinking serves a function of providing meaningfulness for life 
events. Student participants thought about how they had made the decision to come to their 
current university. Participants in the counterfactual condition then thought about how this 
decision could have been different. Participants in the control condition were not prompted to 
reflect on this decision. All participants then evaluated how their choice of university is 
meaningful in their lives. Participants who thought counterfactually about their university 
choice gave higher meaningfulness ratings for coming to the specific university than 
participants who did not think counterfactually. This demonstrates that counterfactual 
thinking may have another function, different from driving future behaviour, which is to 
provide a sense of meaningfulness about events they have experienced. 
In a similar approach, McCrea (2008) suggested that, because counterfactual thinking 
is concerned with finding reasons for past failed attempts, counterfactual thinking can also 
provide excuses for past failed attempts and poor performances. He explored whether this 
excuse-providing function of counterfactual thinking reduces motivation to try harder in a 
future task. In his study, all participants attempted a math test without enough practice. 
Participants in the counterfactual thinking condition thought counterfactually about how they 
could have performed better in the math test. Those in the control condition answered some 
filler questions concerning the test. All participants then took a second math test. Results 
showed that participants in the control condition attempted to solve more questions, and had 
more correct answers than those in the counterfactual thinking condition. McCrea (2008) 
suggested that counterfactual thinking may reduce the motivation to improve performance, 




claims (e.g. Markman, McMullen, & Elizaga, 2008) that counterfactual thinking can improve 
general motivation for future tasks. For example, Markman et al. (2008) asked participants to 
complete a task of anagrams, then asked participants to generate either upward or downward 
counterfactual thoughts about the task. Results showed that both upward counterfactual 
thinking and downward counterfactual thinking can increase participants’ motivation to work 
harder in the subsequent tasks. These contrasting suggestions highlight the need for future 
research that addresses the effect of controllable and uncontrollable counterfactual 
modifications on motivation more thoroughly. In short, this demonstrates counterfactual 
thinking may not be useful in serving a preparatory function for future events, which would 
be in line with my chapter 4 demonstrating that counterfactual thinking leads to fewer 
controllable modifications than prefactual thinking. 
6.5. Limitations and Future Research 
In section 6.5, I consider some of the methodological limitations for the experimental 
chapters of this thesis. Specifically, the experimental chapters of this thesis mainly have three 
limitations. Firstly, the composition of my participants does not have enough diversity. 
Secondly, as for data analysis, I did not compare participants with different linguistic and 
cultural backgrounds. Finally, I did not explore the impact of speculative thinking on actual 
behavioral changes, although I explored the functions of speculative thinking. Based on these 
limitations, I also discuss some future research directions. 
6.5.1. Participants Population 
Firstly, a broad participant population would be good in terms of representativeness, 
and the participant composition of experiments in this thesis may not have enough diversity. 
The participant composition was mainly female, and mainly white British. My participants 
were typical of Psychology students at British universities, but thus represent a rather narrow 




populations limits the generalisability of the claims made from psychological experiments 
(Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2005).  Therefore, more diverse participant population 
should be included in future experiments of speculative thinking to confirm what the 
universals are in this field. 
6.5.2. Linguistic and Cultural Differences 
I excluded the data of non-native English speakers when analyzing the data. The 
reason I did this was to avoid the possible impact of participants’ different English 
proficiency on reading stories and answering questions. Specifically, because non-native 
English speakers may be not as proficient in English as native English speakers, there is a 
possibility that non-native English speakers may not be able to understand the directions to 
think speculatively in these tasks presented in English as well as native English speakers, 
which may result in inaccurate experimental results. In fact, there is debate as to whether 
language influences counterfactual thinking (e.g. Au, 1983; Au, 1984; Bloom, 1981; Feng & 
Yi, 2006; Liu, 1985; Jing-Schmidt, 2017; Yeh & Gentner, 2005). For example, Bloom (1981) 
suggested that Chinese language does not have a specific structure of subjunctive (that is the 
counterfactual marker to identify counterfactual thoughts), therefore native Chinese speaker 
may find it difficult to understand counterfactual thoughts. On the other hand, some recent 
studies (e.g. Jing-Schmidt, 2017) suggested that there is vocabulary and grammatical 
structure in Chinese to express counterfactual thoughts, which can help native Chinese 
speakers to understand counterfactual thoughts. 
Therefore, the cultural and linguistic differences when having speculative thinking are 
also worth exploring. It would be useful for future studies to compare results from 
participants whose first language is English with those who have another first language, to 
see whether results about speculative thinking (as demonstrated in my empirical chapters) 




6.5.3. Application to Real Behavioral Changes 
It remains unclear that whether behavioral intentions that are hypothetical can really 
lead to real behavior changes. For example, Camerer and Mobbs (2017) suggested that when 
thinking about events in the hypothetical situation, people’s behavioral intention generated by 
the events would differ from actual behaviors in the real world. They reviewed some 
experiments in psychology and cognitive neuroscience areas that demonstrated differences 
between hypothetical and real choices. Camerer and Mobbs (2017) suggested that, due to the 
limitations of experimental conditions, many studies used hypothetical tasks that only have 
hypothetical consequences rather than real consequences, which may make the results less 
applicable to the reality. Also, as I discussed in last section (i.e. section 6.4.), although 
Hammell & Chan (2016) found that participants who thought prefactually generated more 
controllable modifications than participants thinking counterfactually, they did not find link 
from controllable modifications to real behavioural changes.  
In my chapter 4, although I found that participants thinking prefactually focused on 
more controllable modifications than participants thinking counterfactually, I did not really 
compare whether participants thinking about event will have greater performance 
improvement in the second task than participants thinking about hypothetical event. That is 
because chapter 4 focuses on the content of speculative thoughts generated by participants 
rather than their actual behaviors, participants thinking about hypothetical event were not 
required to do the second task. Future research can build on previously published studies by 
testing whether the difference between thinking about the hypothetical and reality is 
difference in whether the events can be changed or not. 
Moreover, although there has been much research about counterfactual thinking, 
research about general speculative thinking (including counterfactual thinking, prefactual 




dimensions influence controllable modifications. Future research can further explore the 
function of general speculative thinking from other dimensions such as the direction of 
speculative thinking (i.e. upward / downward), which can enrich the theories related to 
general speculative thinking.  
6.6. Conclusion 
My thesis provides a more comprehensive picture of the functions of speculative 
thinking, discussing the functions of broad speculative thinking from the perspectives of 
preparatory and non-preparatory functions. Chapter 2 links traditional research on 
counterfactual determinants with the functional theory, suggesting that one non-preparatory 
function that counterfactual thinking serves is conveying information from others’ 
counterfactuals. Chapter 5 explores another non-preparatory function of counterfactual 
thinking, demonstrating that lying seemed to be influenced by the controllability of events in 
a way that counterfactual thinking was not. On the other hand, chapter 4 demonstrates that 
counterfactual thinking might serve no preparatory function or less preparatory function than 
prefactual thinking. Chapter 3 further supports the possibility that counterfactual thinking 
serves less preparatory function than prefactual thinking from psychological distance and 
construal level perspectives. To conclude, this thesis demonstrates that there are other 
functions than preparatory functions that speculative thinking serves, and there are difference 





Appendix A: Stories Used in Experiment 1 
Plane story used in experiment 1. Text in square brackets [ ] was added for the version 
of the story in experiment 1. 
Please read the reading material and answer the following questions: 
Michael [John] was 25 years old, single, and a management trainee at a national bank 
in downtown Toronto [London]. After his first few months on the job, he was required to 
participate in a training seminar out of town. This was an important seminar; after completing 
it he could be certified and assigned his first management position. His flight was scheduled 
to leave at 4PM from Pearson Airport in Toronto [Stansted Airport in London], so he left 
early from work to drive to the airport. Having been to the airport several times recently to 
pick up clients as part of his job, Michael [John] had settled on a particular route that he liked 
to take. He decided that today he would stick to this favoured route to the airport. However, 
Michael [John] was soon caught in a major traffic jam. While he was driving, the airline 
called him, said the flight may take off at the scheduled time but it may also be delayed a 
little due to aviation control reasons [(which means John might still have a chance to catch 
the plane)]. Michael [John] went to the airport, still hoping to catch the flight. He arrived an 
hour after the scheduled departure time.  When he got to the ticket desk, he learned that his 
flight had indeed left.  
No counterfactuals version: The assistant on the desk told him the flight had gone, 
and the assistant also told him how close to his arrival time it was. After John heard what the 




Fewer counterfactuals version: The assistant on the desk told him the flight had gone, 
and the assistant also told him how close to his arrival time it was. After Michael heard what 
the assistant said, Michael said: “If I had left home earlier, I would have caught the flight.” 
More counterfactuals version: After Michael heard what the assistant said, Michael 
said: “If I had left home earlier, I would have caught the flight. Why didn't I check the traffic 
conditions in advance? If only I caught the flight rather than missed it, I would have been at 
the destination now. If I thought about the traffic in advance, I would have not been blocked 
on the road. If I booked earlier tickets, then I would have avoided this traffic jam. I really feel 
regret.” 
Fire story used in experiment 1. Text in square brackets [ ] was added for the version 
of the story in experiment 1. 
Please read the following interview about home insurance, and answer the following questions: 
 
“Because I [Greg/Jack] lived in an apartment, I [Greg/Jack] never thought that 
property insurance was necessary. However, after speaking with a friend who sold insurance, 
I [Greg/Jack] realized the importance of such insurance. Thus, I [Greg/Jack] had my [his] 
friend write up a policy that I [he] could examine, sign, and send in later that day. Due to my 
[his] busy schedule, however, I [Greg/Jack] forgot to send in the policy. This turned out to be 
a big mistake because later, a fire ravaged my [his] apartment. I [He] lost everything and had 
no cover. 
No counterfactuals version: After that, Greg said: “I lost all my belongings in the fire 
and I was not covered by any insurance.” 
Fewer counterfactuals version: After that, Jack said: “If I had remembered to send in 
the policy, I would have had insurance cover now.” 




policy, I would have had insurance cover now. Why didn't I send in the policy right after I 
decided to buy it? If only I sent in the policy rather than forgetting to do so, I would have 
reduced the losses the fire brought me. If I had made a note to remind me, I would have avoided 
forgetting to send in the policy. If only I set myself a reminder to send in the policy, I would 






Appendix B: Stories Used in Experiment 2 
Plane story used in experiment 2.  
Please read the reading material and answer the following questions: 
Michael was 25 years old, single, and a management trainee at a national bank in 
downtown Toronto. After his first few months on the job, he was required to participate in a 
training seminar out of town. This was an important seminar; after completing it he could be 
certified and assigned his first management position. His flight was scheduled to leave at 
4PM from Pearson Airport in Toronto, so he left early from work to drive to the airport. 
Having been to the airport several times recently to pick up clients as part of his job, Michael 
had settled on a particular route that he liked to take. He decided that today he would stick to 
this favoured route to the airport. However, Michael was soon caught in a major traffic jam. 
While he was driving, the airline called him, said the flight may take off at the scheduled time 
but it may also be delayed a little due to aviation control reasons. Michael went to the airport, 
still hoping to catch the flight. He arrived an hour after the scheduled departure time.  When 
he got to the ticket desk, he learned that his flight had indeed left.  
Fewer counterfactuals version: When he found he had missed the flight, he said: “I 
should have left earlier.” 
More counterfactuals version: When he found he had missed the flight, he said: “I 
should have left earlier. Why didn't I check the traffic conditions in advance? If only I caught 
the flight rather than missed it, I would have been at the destination now. If I thought about 
the traffic in advance, I would have not been blocked on the road. If I booked earlier tickets, 




Fire story used in experiment 2. 
Please read the following interview about home insurance which is written by a 
college student named Greg Sawyer: 
“Because I lived in an apartment, I never thought that property insurance was 
necessary. However, after speaking with a friend who sold insurance, I realized the 
importance of such insurance. Thus, I had my friend write up a policy that I could examine, 
sign, and send in later that day. Due to my busy schedule, however, I forgot to send in the 
policy. This turned out to be a big mistake because later, a fire ravaged my apartment. I lost 
everything and had no coverage. 
Fewer counterfactuals version: I should have thought about insurance earlier.”  
More counterfactuals version: Why didn't I send the policy since I decided to? If only 
I sent that policy rather than forgetting to do so, I would have had enough money now. If I 
remembered to subscribe to insurance information alerts, I would have avoided forgetting to 
send the insurance policy. If only I’d set myself a reminder to send off the policy, I would 





Appendix C: Stories Used in Experiment 3 
Controllability story used in experiment 3. Text in square brackets [ ] was added for the 
second version of the story in experiment 3. 
Please read the reading material and answer the following questions: 
A bank employee, Mr. Bianchi [Williams], who worked in an agency situated in a 
village near to the one where he lived with his wife. The day of the accident he was going home 
after work but his progress toward home was delayed by an event. When he arrived home, Mr. 
Bianchi [Williams] found his wife on the floor. He realized that she had had a heart attack and 
she was dying. He tried to help her, but his efforts were in vain.   
No counterfactuals version: Mr. Williams very sadly said: “I feel so sad for my wife.” 
Fewer counterfactuals version: Mr. Bianchi very sadly said: “If I had come home early, 
I might have been able to save my wife.” 
More counterfactuals version: Mr. Bianchi very sadly said: “If I had come home early, 
I might have been able to save my wife. If I had come home earlier, I would have been able to 
see her one last time. If I had come home earlier, I could have been able to take her to the 





Appendix D: Stories Used in Experiment 4 
Exceptionality story used in experiment 4.  Text in square brackets [ ] was added for the 
second version of the story in experiment 4. 
Mr. Jones [Jackson] was 47 years old, the father of three and a successful banking 
executive. His wife has been ill at home for several months. On the day of the accident, Mr. 
Jones [Jackson] left his office at the regular time. He sometimes left early to take care of home 
chores at his wife’s request, but this was not necessary on that day. Mr. Jones [Jackson] chose 
a route. The accident occurred at a major intersection. The light turned amber as Mr. Jones 
[Jackson] approached. Witnesses noted that he braked hard to stop at the crossing, although he 
could easily have gone through. His family recognized this as a common occurrence in Mr. 
Jones [Jackson]’ driving. As he began to cross after the light changed, a light truck charged into 
the intersection at top speed, and rammed Mr. Jones [Jackson]’ car from the left. Mr. Jones 
[Jackson] was killed instantly. 
No counterfactuals version: Mr. Jackson’s wife said “I feel so sad for my husband”. 
Fewer counterfactuals version: Mr. Jones’ wife said “If it were Tuesday, he would have 
been working at home”. 
More counterfactuals version: The Jones’s wife said “If only Jones chose the other route. 
If he went the other way, he might have been able to avoid the accident. If he had gone the 
other way, he might not have died. Why he had to go that route. I should have been able to 





Appendix E: Open-Ended and Forced-Choice Questionnaires Used in Experiment 5 
 [The written instructions for Future-Close condition are presented on the following 
pages. Any deviations of Future-Distant conditions from Future-Close condition are shown 
in square brackets.] 
Introduction: Your task is to imagine that you will do seven activities tomorrow [next 
year], and to describe these activities. Of course, there are no right or wrong answers. People 
simply differ in their descriptions of different behaviours, and we are interested in your 
personal descriptions.  
1. Please imagine that tomorrow [next year] you will read a science fiction book, and 
describe this activity. 
2. Please imagine that tomorrow [next year] you will move into a new apartment, and 
describe this activity. 
3. Please imagine that tomorrow [next year] you will spend a weekend with your 
family, and describe this activity. 
4. Please imagine that tomorrow [next year] you will take an exam, and describe this 
activity. 
5. Please imagine that tomorrow [next year] you will have a party at your apartment, 
and describe this activity. 
6. Please imagine that tomorrow [next year] you will write a letter to your family, and 
describe this activity. 






[The written instructions for Past-Close condition are presented on the following 
pages. Any deviations of Past-Distant conditions from Past-Close condition are shown in 
square brackets.] 
Introduction: Your task is to imagine that you did seven activities yesterday [last 
year], and to describe these activities. Of course, there are no right or wrong answers. People 
simply differ in their descriptions of different behaviours, and we are interested in your 
personal descriptions.  
1. Please imagine that yesterday [last year] you read a science fiction book, and 
describe this activity. 
2. Please imagine that yesterday [last year] you moved into a new apartment, and 
describe this activity. 
3. Please imagine that yesterday [last year] you spent a weekend with your family, and 
describe this activity. 
4. Please imagine that yesterday [last year] you took an exam, and describe this 
activity. 
5. Please imagine that yesterday [last year] you had a party at your apartment, and 
describe this activity. 
6. Please imagine that yesterday [last year] you wrote a letter to your family, and 
describe this activity. 





Forced-choice questionnaire used in experiment 5. Text in square brackets [ ] was the 
time indicator added for different conditions in Study. 
Instruction: Any behaviour can be identified in many ways. For example, one person 
might describe a behaviour as “typing a paper,” while another might describe the behaviour 
as “pushing keys.” Yet another person might describe the behaviour as “expressing 
thoughts.” We are interested in your personal preferences for how a number of different 
behaviour should be described. On the following pages you will find several different 
behaviours listed. After each behaviour will be two choices of different ways in which the 
behaviour might be identified. Here is an example: 
Attending class 
_a. sitting in a chair 
_b. looking at the board 
Your task is to choose the identification, a or b, that best describes the behaviour for 
you. Simply place a check mark in the space beside the identification statement that you pick. 
Please mark only one alternative for each pair. Of course, there are no right or wrong 
answers. People simply differ in their preferences for the different behaviour descriptions, 
and we are interested in your personal preferences. Be sure to mark your choice for each 
behaviour. Remember, choose the description that you personally believe is more 
appropriate in each pair. 
1. Making a list [tomorrow/yesterday/next year/last year] 
A. Getting organized          B. Writing things down 
2. Reading [tomorrow/yesterday/next year/last year] 
A. Following lines of print         B. Gaining knowledge         
3. Washing clothes [tomorrow/yesterday/next year/last year] 




4. Measuring a room for carpeting [tomorrow/yesterday/next year/last year] 
A. Getting ready to remodel        B. Using a tape measure 
5. Cleaning the house [tomorrow/yesterday/next year/last year] 
A. Showing one's cleanliness        B. Vacuuming the floor 
6. Painting the room [tomorrow/yesterday/next year/last year] 
A. Applying brush strokes         B. Making the room look fresh 
7. Paying the rent [tomorrow/yesterday/next year/last year] 
A. Maintaining a place to live        B. Writing a check 
8. Caring for houseplants [tomorrow/yesterday/next year/last year] 
A. Watering plants         B. Making the room look nice         
9. Locking a door [tomorrow/yesterday/next year/last year] 
A. Putting a key in the lock         B. Securing the house         
10. Filling out a personality test [tomorrow/yesterday/next year/last year] 
A. Answering questions         B. Revealing what you're like         
11. Toothbrushing [tomorrow/yesterday/next year/last year] 
A. Preventing tooth decay        B. Moving a brush around one's mouth 
12. Taking a test [tomorrow/yesterday/next year/last year] 
A. Answering questions         B. Showing one's knowledge         
13. Greeting someone [tomorrow/yesterday/next year/last year] 
A. Saying hello         B. Showing friendliness         
14. Resisting temptation [tomorrow/yesterday/next year/last year] 
A. Saying "no"        B. Showing moral courage         
15. Eating [tomorrow/yesterday/next year/last year] 
A. Getting nutrition        B. Chewing and swallowing 




A. Following a map         B. Seeing countryside         
17. Having cavity filled [tomorrow/yesterday/next year/last year] 
A. Protecting your teeth      B. Going to the dentist 
18. Talking to a child [tomorrow/yesterday/next year/last year] 
A. Teaching a child something          B. Using simple words 
19. Pushing a doorbell [tomorrow/yesterday/next year/last year] 




Appendix F: Scrambled Word Task and Questionnaire Used in Experiment 6 
[The written instructions for reality condition are presented on the following pages. 
Any deviations of hypothetical condition from reality condition are shown in square brackets. 
The scrambled word tasks in four studies were same. Participants in the hypothetical 
condition did not need to do the second scrambled word task.]  
You’re going to participate in an experiment on the psychology of thought. We ask you 
to read and follow the instructions carefully. First, you have to play a game. Its rules are 
explained in detail below.  
“SCRAMBLED-WORD GAME”  
Your task is to find a 6-letter word in each of the 12 grids presented on the next page. 
This word must be readable by moving from one letter to another.  
The game’s rules are as follows:  
- In each grid you need to find a 6-letter word (belonging to the English language). 
Once you find it, write it down in the space provided next to the grid.  
- In each grid you should only look for a 6-letter word (there may also be 2, 3, 4 or 5 
letter words).  
- The first letter of the word can be any of the 8 letters present in the grid.  
- The letters can be linked:         
  
     •vertically                   
    









- You can link only adjoining letters. 
 
- Each letter in the grid can only be used once to form the word. 
- You don’t have to solve the grids in the given order. 
- You have 2 minutes and 15 seconds to complete this task. 
Example of a solved grid: 
           Answer: Actual 
 







      Answer: Adverb 
 
Now, if everything is clear, you can begin the game. Otherwise you can ask for further 
explanation. When you’re ready, tell the experimenter who will start the timer and turn the 
page. Then you can start the game. 
The scrambled-word quizzes are presented below: 
 
      Answer:                
     Answer:                
     Answer:                
     Answer:                
      Answer:                




       Answer:                
        Answer:                
     Answer:                
       Answer:                
         Answer:                
        Answer:                
 
You have just played the “Scrambled-word game”. In a few moments you will play 
the game with new words again. Before starting the next game, we ask you to fill in the 
following questionnaire [You have just played the ‘Scrambled-word game’. The game is 
over, and there will be no more scrambled-word puzzles in this study. However, please 
imagine that in a few moments you will play the game with new words again. We now 
ask you to fill in the following questionnaire]. 
1. What is your gender?  ………. 




not to say 
2. How old are you?  ………. 
3. Are you a Psychology Undergraduate student? ………. 
     A. Yes; B. Other (please specify) ………. 
4. What is your first language?  ………. 
     A. English; B. Other (please specify) ………. 
5. Please indicate the ethnic background that best describes you ………. 
     A. Indian; B. Chinese; C. Other Asian; D. Black African; E. Black Caribbean; F. 
Other Black; G. White Irish; H. White British; I. Other White; J. Mixed Race; K. Other 
(please specify) ………. 
6. A few minutes ago, you played “Scrambled-word quizzes” :  
How do you assess your performance?  
Please, rate your performance playing the scrambled-word game on the following 7-
point scale, where -3 corresponds to “poor performance” and 3 corresponds to “perfect 
performance” (intermediate values correspond to intermediate judgments). Circle the number 
that best represents your rating. 
 
If you solved all 12 grids in the given time, please return the questionnaire to the 
experimenter. Otherwise, before starting the new game, please complete the following 
sentence [Otherwise, imagining that you were about to start a new game, please 
complete the following sentence]:  
 “Things will be better for me in the next game if… [Things would be better for me 














7. What result do you think you will get in the next game [What result do you 
think you would get in the next game]?  
Please give your rating using the following 7-point scale, where -3 corresponds to 
“certainly worse” and 3 corresponds to “certainly better” (intermediate values correspond to 
intermediate judgments). Circle the number that best represents your judgment. 
 
Thank you for completing the questionnaire. Now, you will play the game again, but 
with different grids and solutions. The rules are the same. You have 2 minutes 15 seconds to 
solve as many grinds as you can. When you’re ready, tell the experimenter who will start the 






 Answer:                
    Answer:                
     Answer:                
      Answer:                
      Answer:                
         Answer:                
        Answer:                
         Answer:                
       Answer:                




         Answer:                






Appendix G: Questionnaire Used in Experiment 7 
[The written instructions for future condition are presented on the following pages. 
Any deviations of past condition from future condition are shown in square brackets.]  
You have just played the ‘Scrambled-word game’. The game is over, and there will be 
no more scrambled-word puzzles in this study. However, please imagine that in a few 
moments you will play the game with new words again. We now ask you to fill in the 
following questionnaire. [You have just played the ‘Scrambled-word game’. The game is 
over, and there will be no more scrambled-word puzzles in this study. We now ask you 
to fill in the following questionnaire.] 
1. What is your gender?  ………. 
A. Female; B. Male; C. I prefer to describe my gender in another way; D. Prefer 
not to say 
2. How old are you?  ………. 
3. Are you a Psychology Undergraduate student? ………. 
     A. Yes; B. Other (please specify) ………. 
4. What is your first language?  ………. 
     A. English; B. Other (please specify) ………. 
5. Please indicate the ethnic background that best describes you ………. 
     A. Indian; B. Chinese; C. Other Asian; D. Black African; E. Black Caribbean; F. 
Other Black; G. White Irish; H. White British; I. Other White; J. Mixed Race; K. Other 
(please specify) ………. 
6. A few minutes ago, you played “Scramble-word quizzes” :  
How do you assess your performance?  
Please, rate your performance playing the scrambled-word game on the following 7-




performance” (intermediate values correspond to intermediate judgments). Circle the number 
that best represents your rating. 
 
If you solved all 12 grids in the given time, please return the questionnaire to the 
experimenter. Otherwise, imagining that you were about to start a new game, please complete 
the following sentence:  
 “Things would be better for me in the next game if…” [“Things would have been 
better for me if…” ] 










7. What result do you think you would get in the next game?  
Please give your rating using the following 7-point scale, where -3 corresponds to 
“certainly worse” and 3 corresponds to “certainly better” (intermediate values correspond to 










Appendix H: Questionnaire Used in Experiment 8 
[The written instructions for far condition are presented on the following pages. Any 
deviations of close condition from far condition are shown in square brackets.] 
You have just played the ‘Scrambled-word game’. The game is over, and there will be 
no more scrambled-word puzzles in this study. However, please imagine that in a year you 
will play the game with new words again. [However, please imagine that in a few moments 
you will play the game with new words again.] We now ask you to fill in the following 
questionnaire. 
1. What is your gender?  ………. 
A. Female; B. Male; C. I prefer to describe my gender in another way; D. Prefer 
not to say 
2. How old are you?  ………. 
3. Are you a Psychology Undergraduate student? ………. 
     A. Yes; B. Other (please specify) ………. 
4. What is your first language?  ………. 
     A. English; B. Other (please specify) ………. 
5. Please indicate the ethnic background that best describes you ………. 
     A. Indian; B. Chinese; C. Other Asian; D. Black African; E. Black Caribbean; F. 
Other Black; G. White Irish; H. White British; I. Other White; J. Mixed Race; K. Other 
(please specify) ………. 
6. A few minutes ago, you played “Scramble-word quizzes” :  
How do you assess your performance?  
Please, rate your performance playing the scrambled-word game on the following 7-
point scale, where -3 corresponds to “poor performance” and 3 corresponds to “perfect 




that best represents your rating. 
 
If you solved all 12 grids in the given time, please return the questionnaire to the 
experimenter. Otherwise, imagining that in a year you will play the game with new words 
again, please complete the following sentence [Otherwise, imagining that you were about 
to start a new game, please complete the following sentence]:  
 “Things would be better for me in the next game if…”  










7. What result do you think you would get in the next game?  
Please give your rating using the following 7-point scale, where -3 corresponds to 
“certainly worse” and 3 corresponds to “certainly better” (intermediate values correspond to 











Appendix I: Questionnaire Used in Experiment 9 
Parcel story used in Experiment 9. Text in square brackets [ ] was added for the 
versions of the story. 
Alison’s parents asked her to be home in time for an important delivery after work. 
On her way, Alison stopped off for a coffee for half an hour [was delayed for half an hour by 
the traffic light being broken]. Alison arrived home just before the delivery was due only to 
discover that it arrived 5 minutes early and she missed it. 
Ella’s parents also asked her to be home in time for an important delivery after work. 
On her way, Ella was delayed for half an hour by the traffic light being broken [stopped off 
for a coffee for half an hour]. Ella arrived home just before the delivery was due only to 
discover that it arrived 5 minutes early and she missed it. 
Counterfactual thinking question: Although you cannot tell for sure from the reading 
materials, who spends more time thinking about how things could have been different? 
Lying question: Although you cannot tell for sure from the reading materials, who 





Appendix I: Questionnaire Used in Experiment 10 
Parcel story used in Experiment 10. Text in square brackets [ ] was added for the 
versions of the story. 
Alison’s parents asked her to be home in time for an important delivery after work. 
On her way, Alison stopped off for a coffee for half an hour. She was also delayed for half an 
hour by the traffic light being broken. [Alison was delayed for half an hour by the traffic light 
being broken. She also stopped off for a coffee for half an hour.] Alison arrived home just 
before the delivery was due only to discover that it arrived 5 minutes early and she missed it. 
Counterfactual thinking condition: Alison thinks about how things could have been 
different. What do you think she is more likely to think about: 
A. “Things could have been better if I didn’t stop for coffee.”  
B. “Things could have been better if the traffic light wasn’t broken.” 
Lying condition: Alison lies to her parents about why she arrived home when she did. 
What do you think she is more likely to lie about: 
A. The traffic light being broken 
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